BOTTA V. BRUNNER REVISITED:
ARGUING PER DIEM DAMAGES
IN SUMMATION
[T]he Botta v. Brunner rule is not immutable. If it can be demonstrated that it is bottomed on faulty reasoning, or that it has not
achieved its intended purpose and actually prejudices a plaintiff's
ability to recover a fair amount of damages for pain and suffering,
recourse to this Court is available.
Justice Sullivan writing for the majority in
Cox v. Valley Fair Corp.'
INTRODUCTION
The Code of Professional Responsibility compels attorneys to
represent their clients zealously.' This representation, especially in
the eyes of the public, occurs most frequently in litigation. Informative opening statements, sharp cross examinations, and dramatic, convincing summations are tools a lawyer employs to effectuate this mandate. In a minority of jurisdictions headed by New Jersey,3 however,
severe constraints are placed upon counsel's ability to make persuasive jury arguments in personal injury cases.
During the 1950's the per diem formula was introduced into personal injury litigation as a new method of arguing damages.' This is
a mathematical formula by which plaintiff's attorney suggests that the
jurors, when computing an award for pain and suffering, apply a dollar figure per day multiplied by the total number of days of pain
suffered. 5 Some legal commentators heralded this approach as a
boon to effective advocacy of the pain and suffering damage issue. 6
83 N.J. 381, 386, 416 A.2d 809, 812 (1980).
2

N.J.

CT.

R. DR7-101; Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44

A.B.A.J. 1159, 1160-61 (1958).
3 Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d 166, 175, 417 P.2d 673, 677, 53 Cal. Rptr. 129, 133 (1966).
Sounding "[tihe opening guns in the battle to prohibit" per diem arguments, Botta v. Brunner
has been a model for other state courts taking a stand against the use of per diem arguments in
personal injury cases. Id. Conversely, Beagle represents the majority view which permits formula summations. Id.
Cooper, The Role of the Per Diem Argument in Personal Injury Suits, 5 DuQ. U. L. REv.
393, 396 (1967); Note, 18 HASTINGs L.J. 684, 684 (1967). See generally Belli, Demonstrative
Evidence and the Adequate Award, 22 Miss. L.J. 284 (1951).
5 Carton, Justice Francis and the Botta Rule-A Continuing Controversy, 24 RUTCERS L.
REV. 443, 443-44 (1970). In the case of permanent injuries, the jury must consider the number
of days the plaintiff has suffered in the past and will suffer in the future. Id. at 444.
' Phillips, Botta in Focus, 6 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 69 (1962); Comment, 60 MICH. L. REV.
612 (1962).
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Others condemned it as an invasion of the province of the jury and
anticipated it would open the floodgates for excessive verdicts. 7 The
parameters of the controversy came into sharp focus in Botta v.
Brunner' wherein the Supreme Court of New Jersey persuasively
rocked the theoretical foundations of the per diem argument.9 The
result was the judicially promulgated "Botta Rule," a prohibition
against suggesting to the jury a specific dollar amount per unit of
time or a total dollar amount as compensation for pain and
suffering." This rule sparked a great debate in the courts in every
jurisdiction." When presented with the per diem issue, courts have
prohibited the argument, 12 permitted the argument,13 and permitted
the argument with limitations."
The most recent development in the controversy again focuses
attention on the courts of New Jersey. In Cox v. Valley Fair Corp.,"
Alan Medvin represented a plaintiff who had sustained personal
injuries.6 Cognizant of New Jersey's Botta Rule, 17 the attorney in his
summation attempted to illustrate how people equate pain with
money by drawing a parallel between choosing to pay for a painkiller
and choosing to experience pain, and then placing a monetary value
on that pain.' 8 In so doing, Medvin convinced the jury that the
plaintiff's damages for pain and suffering were worth approximately
$50,000.'" The New Jersey supreme court, not convinced of this
amount, concluded that counsel's summation violated the spirit of
Botta.20 A new trial was ordered solely on the issue of damages." As
7 Carton, supra note 5; Note, supra note 4.
8 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958). Several articles written immediately following the Botta
decision demonstrate the variety and seriousness of the reaction to the ruling. See, e.g., Recent
Cases, 28 U. CIN. L. REv. 138 (1958); Recent Cases, 12 RUTCERS L. REv. 522 (1958); Recent

Developments, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 780 (1958).
26 N.J. at 92-103, 138 A.2d at 718-25. See notes 89-105 infra and accompanying text.
10 26 N.J. at 103-04, 138 A.2d at 25.
" The controversy over the use of per diem arguments is reflected in a number of articles
written on the subject. See, e.g., Carton, supra note 5; Cooper, supra note 4; Phillips, supra
note 6. See also the commentary collected in Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d 166, 174-75, 417
P.2d 673, 677, 53 Cal. Rptr. 129, 133 (1966). For a collection of cases dealing with per diem
arguments, see Annot., 3 A.L.R.4th 940 (1981). This annotation supercedes Annot., 60
A.L.R.2d 1347 (1958 & Supplements 1976 & 1980).
12 See, e.g., cases collected in note 43 infra.
13See, e.g., cases collected in note 125 infra.
" See, e.g., Warp v. Whitmore, 123 Il. App. 2d 45, 260 N.E.2d 45 (1970); Graeff v. Baptist
Temple, 576 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1978); Combined Ins. Co. v. Sinclair, 584 P.2d 1034 (Wyo.
1978); cases collected in notes 126 & 127 infra.
1583 N.J. 381, 416 A.2d 809 (1980).
16 Id. at 383, 416 A.2d at 810.
"1 Id. at 387, 416 A.2d at 812.
Ild. at 384-85, 416 A.2d at 811.
" Id. at 383, 416 A.2d at 810.
o Id. at 385, 416 A.2d at 812.
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in Sisyphus' dilemma, plaintiff's attorney successfully pushed a rock
uphill only to have it roll back down and come to rest at the foot of
the hill.
The Botta Rule and its latest extension in the Cox decision are
indeed open to question. The supreme court's invitation to reevaluate this rule 22 should not go unanswered. This comment will examine
the validity of the Botta Rule in the 1980's and explore the scope and
implications of the Cox expansion in light of New Jersey case law and
the development of the per diem approach in other jurisdictions.
THE THEORETICAL SETTING
In the typical personal injury action the remedy sought by the
plaintiff is compensatory damages for the injuries sustained.23 Trial
attorneys normally divide these damages into special and general
categories. Special damages include the actual out-of-pocket medical
expenses flowing from the injuries,2 4 while general damages constitute
compensation for the plaintiff's pain and suffering. 25 The former
category is readily ascertainable in the market place.2 6 It is the latter
27
category which creates the difficulties.
Traditionally, the jury is instructed that if it finds for the plaintiff, it must then determine an amount of money to compensate for
the plaintiff's injuries.2 ' There is no standard rule, however, for
Id. at 387, 416 A.2d at 812.
See text accompanying note I supra. Subsequent to Cox, the New Jersey supreme court
submitted the Botta Rule to the Civil Practice Committee "to consider . . . [its] continued
efficacy." 106 N.J.L.J. 405, 405 (1980),
' C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 137 (1935). In a tort action, the
purpose of awarding compensatory damages is to make the injured party whole by giving him a
sum of money which will restore him as closely as possible to the position he would have been
in had the wrong not occurred. Id. See James, Damages in Accident Cases, 41 CORNELL L. Q.
582 (1956), reprinted in, S. SCHREIBER, DAMAGES IN PERSONAL INJURY AND WRONGFUL DEATH
CASES 17 (1965).
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 23, § 8. Other special damages include: lost time and earnings, impairment of future earnings, aggravation of preexisting ailments, and "insanity resulting
from the injury." Id.
Id. Physical pain is the immediate effect upon the nerves and brain resulting from injury
to the body.
Beside the mental distress which is the accompanying shadow of physical pain, the
courts have most frequently authorized compensation for the following: The victim's
fright and terror at the time of the injury, and reasonable apprehension thereafter
over the effects of the injury upon his health; apprehension of a pregnant woman of
injury to the child; anxiety over inability to make a living; and fear of death or
insanity as a consequence of the injury.
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 23, § 88 (footnotes omitted).
See James, supra note 23, at 590-92.
z C. MCCORMICK, supra note 23, § 88. The difficulty of translating pain and suffering into
dollars and cents is at the heart of the per diem argument controversy. Id.
a See, e.g., J. ALEXANDER, JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON MEDICAL ISSUES 213 (1966).
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translating pain and suffering into dollars and cents.2" Damages for
pain and suffering are evaluated by estimating the amount that a
reasonable person would deem to be fair compensation; the only
measure of these damages is the enlightened conscience of impartial
jurors.3' To date, no judicial consensus has emerged on the propriety
of juries using mathematical formulas in determining an award for
3
pain and suffering.
To aid the jury in arriving at an amount, attorneys present a
number of arguments concerning pain and suffering. For example, an
attorney might urge the jurors "to fix what they would want as compensation if they had sustained the [plaintiff's] injuries or what the
pain and suffering would be worth to them." 32 This approach,
termed "an appeal to the golden rule," is universally condemned. 3
The underpinning of the rejection of the golden rule is that a plaintiff
may not sit in judgment of himself, a juror would not be a fair judge
of the case if he were permitted to place himself in the shoes of the
plaintiff.3" Any proposed method of computing damages combined
with an appeal to the golden rule would be similarly condemned. 5
One method of assisting the jury in its function of providing fair
compensation for the plaintiff is to inform it of the amount the plaintiff believes the injuries are worth. 6 The ad damnum clause, which
is either a part of the complaint or a separate pleading, is the vehicle
whereby the plaintiff notifies the defendant of the amount of money
sought in the lawsuit. 7 Two rationales for permitting an attorney to
inform the jury of the ad damnum clause are that it places a limit on
the plaintiff's damages3' and that it is accepted custom and practice.'5
26 N.J. at 92-93, 138 A.2d at 718-19.
' Id. at 94-95, 138 A.2d at 719-20. For a discussion of the inadequacies of the traditional
approach, see notes 261-64 infra and accompanying text.
"1 Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1347, § 2 (1958 & Supplements 1976 & 1980). For a discussion of
the jury's employment of per diem formulas, see note "259infra.
32 26 N.J. at 94, 138 A.2d at 719. This argument-an appeal to the golden rule-may refer
specifically to the "golden rule" or may use language patterned after the Biblical quotation
attributed to Jesus in Luke 6:31. "'Do to others what you would have them do to you."' Luke
6:31 (New American). See Matthew 7:12 (New American) (alternate phrasing). For an example
of a golden rule argument see note 75 infra.
See cases collected in Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d 927 § 3 (1960 & Supplement 1978).
a Faught v. Washam, 329 S.W.2d 588, 602 (Mo. 1959).
For examples of arguments combining an appeal to the golden rule with a suggestion of a
per diem formula, see notes 75 & 154 infra.
Graeff v. Baptist Temple, 576 S.W.2d 291, 302 (Mo. 1978). See cases collected in Annot.,
14 A.L.R.3d 541 (1967 & Supplement 1980).
17 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 35 (5th e& 1979).
' Franco v. Fujimoto, 47 Hawaii 408, 422, 390 P.2d 740, 748-49 (1964) (overruled in part in
Barretto v. Akau, 51 Hawaii 383, 393, 463 P.2d 917, 923 (1969)).
3' Duguay v. Gelinas, 104 N.H. 182, 187, 182 A.2d 451, 454 (1962).
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Some courts reject this method on the grounds that the ad damnum
40
clause states the price of pain and has no probative value.
Under the lump sum approach, an attorney may suggest a sum
for plaintiff's total suffering which he believes is fairly inferred from
the evidence.' Further, he may be permitted to suggest lump sums
2
for specific periods, for instance, $250 for time spent in traction.1
This form of argument has been approved as customary trial
practice 43 and deemed "far less misleading" than a per diem
argument. 44 Nonetheless, the lump sum and the ad damnum
approaches have been rejected by some courts which assert that the
jury will accept the attorney's suggestion without critically analyzing
4
the evidence. 5
The most controversial method of aiding the jury, and the focus
of this comment, is the technique whereby an attorney argues a dollar-figure-per-unit-of-time equation-the per diem formula.6 This
equation contains two variables: a dollar unit and a time unit. Assuming the jury decides to use the formula, it must then substitute a
number for each variable. The attorney assists the jury in choosing a
dollar unit by suggesting that it either consider the attorney's opinion
of the value of pain 47 or formulate its own opinion of that value.4s

10 E.g., Affett v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 11 Wis. 2d 604, 614, 106 N.W.2d
274, 280 (1960).
" E.g., Caley v. Manicke, 24 Ill. 2d 390, 394, 182 N.E.2d 206, 209 (1962); Halsted v.
Kosnar, 18 Wis. 2d 348, 352, 118 N.W.2d 864, 866 (1963); Affett v. Milwaukee & Suburban
Transp. Co., 11 Wis. 2d 604, 614, 106 N.W.2d 274, 280 (1960).
' E.g., Graeff v. Baptist Temple, 576 S.W.2d 299, 303 (Mo. 1978).
43 E.g., Caley v. Manicke, 24 I11.2d 390, 394, 182 N.E.2d 206, 209 (1962); Caylor v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 190 Kan. 261, 263-64, 372 P.2d 53, 54-55 (1962); Faught v.
Washam, 329 S.W.2d 588, 602 (Mo. 1959); Affett v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 11
Wis. 2d 604, 614, 106 N.W.2d 274, 280 (1960). In the case of Halsted v. Kosnar, 18 Wis. 2d
348, 118 N.W.2d 864 (1963), the court noted that the jury's ability to follow the court's instructions on damages and to recognize "lawyer's talk" would be a sufficient safeguard against the
jury's yielding to the advocate's excessive demands. Id. at 352, 118 N.W.2d at 866. For a
discussion of safeguards used with per diem arguments, see notes 273-79 infra and accompanying text.
" Caley v. Manicke, 24 I11.2d 390, 394, 182 N.E.2d 206, 209 (1962). E.g., Caylor v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 190 Kan. 261, 263-64, 374 P.2d 53, 54-55 (1962).
E.g., Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. at 104, 138 A.2d at 725; Purpora v. Public Serv. Elec. &
Gas Co., 53 N.J. Super. 475, 481, 147 A.2d 591, 594-95 (App. Div. 1959). See cases collected in
Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 541, § 4 (1967 & 1980 Supplement).
' See Carton, supra note 5, at 443-44.
17 See, e.g., Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So.2d 82, 89 (Fla. Ct. Dis. App. 1959); Arnold v.
Ellis, 231 Miss. 757, 765, 97 So.2d 744, 747 (1957); Four-County Elec. Power Ass'n v. Clardy,
221 Miss. 403, 429-30, 73 So.2d 144, 151 (1954); J.D. Wright & Son Truckline v. Chandler, 231
S.W.2d 786, 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
'5 See, e.g., Evening Star Newspaper Co. v. Gray, 179 A.2d 377, 382 (D.C. 1962); Edwards
v. Lawton, 244 S.C. 276, 281, 136 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1964).
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Alternatively, the attorney may make no suggestion."9 The time variable used by the jury is the number of days suffered prior to trial",
and, in the case of permanent injury, the number of days remaining
in the plaintiff's life expectancy.," A separate question relates to the
mode of presenting the argument, for example, expert testimony,
charts, blackboards, oral argument, or instructions to the jury.-"2 This
comment will primarily examine the per diem approach in the context of oral argument.A careful examination of per diem summations reveals a subjective basis for differentiating between per diem arguments used to
illustrate or suggest and those used to influence or persuade. The
courts have not articulated the distinguishing characteristics, but in
many instances the distinction appears to hinge upon the language of
the argument.
Generally, to "illustrate" means to clarify by examples, and to
"suggest" means to mention for consideration." A per diem argument may either suggest a formula as a method for computing damages or demonstrate the technique by examples, or both. During
summation, plaintiff's counsel might present this typical illustrative
argument:
There is no rule of damages for converting pain and suffering
into dollars and cents. Any determination of damages must be
based on your impartial judgment. You can, however, estimate the
value of plaintiff's pain and suffering if you decide that he is entitled to compensation. For example, you may decide that he is enti-

tled to one dollar a day for his pain. In that case, multiply this sum
by the one hundred days he has suffered since the accident and/or
the 7,300 days (20 years) he has remaining in his life expectancy.'

Under this approach the attorney merely suggests the use of a formula, and does not attempt to persuade the jury to adopt his figures.
19E.g., King v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 107 N.W.2d 509, 517 (N.D. 1961). See note
62 infra and accompanying text.
Io See, e.g., Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So.2d 82, 85-86 (Fla. Dis. Ct. App. 1959); Crum v.
Ward, 146 W.Va. 421, 426-27, 122 S.E.2d 18, 22 (1961).
" See, e.g., Cross v. Robert E. Lamb Co., 60 N.J, Super. 53, 76-77, 158 A.2d 359, 371-72,
cereif. denied, 32 N.J. 350, 160 A.2d 847 (1960); Crum v. Ward, 146 WVa. 421, 426-27, 122
S.E.2d 18, 22 (1961). See generally 1 M. BELLI, MODERN TRIALS § 133(2) at 870-72 (1954).
' See 1 M. BELLI, supra note 51, §§ 130-36.
' The discussion concerning oral per diem arguments applies equally to per diem formulas
presented in blackboard illustrations. See notes 161-71 infra and accompanying text for an example of a blackboard illustration.
'

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL

DICTIONARY

1127, 2286 (3d ed. 1971).

" This argument is modeled after an illustrative argument approved in Edwards v. Lawton,
244 S.C. 276, 278-81, 136 S.E.2d 708, 709-11 (1964).
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467

Ideally, the jury then applies an analogous course of reasoning to
arrive at its own value for pain and suffering.'
An attorney's reminder to the jury that only it can place a
monetary value on pain; 7 a mention of per diem sums qualified by
the phrase "reasonable compensation;" the suggestion of a formula
not presented as the only correct approach for computing damages; 59
and use of the per diem technique to explain the manner in which
the amount sought was determined 6" are each characteristic of an
illustrative argument. Also characteristic is the absence of an attorney's opinion as to the value of the plaintiff's pain."' One court has
described what may be the purest form of illustrative argument-a
suggestion of the mechanics of a formula as a method for computing
damages without suggesting dollar amounts for particular time
periods. 62
Opposed to the illustrative argument is the "influential" or "persuasive" per diem argument. In addition to presenting a per diem
formula to the jury, this argument may appeal to the individual interests of the jurors or be in some way inflammatory. For instance,
under the "job offer" approach the attorney offers the jurors the job
of suffering plaintiff's pain and physical disability for a particular
'6 Courts permitting illustrative arguments usually require an instruction to the jury that the
argument is not evidence. E.g., Johnson v. Brown, 75 Nev. 437, 447, 345 P.2d 745, 759 (1959);
Jones v. Hogan, 56 Wash. 2d 23, 32, 351 P.2d 153, 159 (1960). See, e.g., cases collected in note
127 infra.
17 Evening Star Newspaper Co. v. Gray, 179 A.2d 377, 382 (D.C. 1962); Edwards v. Lawton, 244 S.C. 276, 281, 136 S.E.2d 708, 710-11 (1964).
' Evening Star Newspaper Co. v. Cray, 179 A.2d 377, 382 (D.C. 1962). In approving an
illustrative argument, the court apparently found that use of the phrase "fair and reasonable
compensation" in conjunction with suggested dollar figures mitigated any potential prejudice
arising from the figures by reminding the jury of its duty to award only reasonable compensation. Id. Nevertheless, the New Jersey supreme court in Cox found that a comment concerning
fair compensation for each day of plaintiff's life expectancy to be a component of a suggested
formula. 83 N.J. at 385-86, 416 A.2d at 812. See notes 194 & 202 infra and accompanying
text.
5'E.g., Warp v. Whitmore, 123 I11.
App. 2d 157, 164, 260 N.E.2d 45, 49 (1970). For a
discussion of the Warp case, see notes 141-46 infra and accompanying text.
' E.g., Newbury v.Vogel, 151 Colo. 520, 526, 379 P.2d 811, 814 (1963); Corkery v. Greenberg, 253 Iowa 846, 855, 114 N.W.2d 327, 332 (1962).
11 Edwards v. Lawton, 244 S.C. 276, 281, 136 S.E.2d 708, 710-11 (1964).
62 King v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 107 N.W.2d 509, 517 (N.D. 1961). The North
Dakota Supreme Court held that counsel's use of sheets of paper to present a mathematical
formula for pain on a per week or per year basis was improper, since there was no evidence to
substantiate the values for pain. Id. at 516-17. It then stated that it would be permissible for
the attorney to suggest the use of a formula without referring to particular dollar values. Id. at
517. The court found that such a suggestion would not invade the province of the jury. Id.
Thus, this court approved an illustrative per diem argument without dollar figures and successfully harmonized this approach with the invasion-of-the-province-of-the-jury premise. Consider
the discussion of Cox in notes 213-37 infra and accompanying text.
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amount per day for each day the plaintiff suffered or will suffer pain.'
A mathematical formula for pain and suffering persuasively presented
in this manner intensifies the jurors' normally sympathetic reaction to
the discussion of pain.' Thus, a single reference to a dollar figure
may have a great impact on the jurors' determination of damages
when presented in an inflammatory manner.
Similarly, repetition of the same dollar figure in an argument
purportedly for illustrative purposes may be deemed an influential
argument. For example, an attorney might argue to the jury:
I would like to suggest to you a method of computing
plaintiff's damages for pain and suffering. This method involves
multiplying some dollar figure-let's say $10 a day-times the
number of days remaining in plaintiff's life expectancy. Now let me
demonstrate how this formula works. Let's assume plaintiff has a
life expectancy of 20 years-in days, that would be 7,300 days.
Again, I have suggested $10 a day. Applying the formula, $10
per day times 7,300 would equal $73,000 dollars in damages.
You, members of the jury, of course are not bound by the $10
per day figure, but in my opinion $10 per day appears reasonable.
I decided upon $10 a day by averaging amounts for days of greater
pain, for example, $15 per day, and for days of lesser pain, $5 per
day.6

These multiple references to the same dollar figure cause the figure
to be accepted unconsciously by the jury as a true indication of the
Faught v. Washam, 392 S.W.2d 588, 602 (Mo. 1959). In Faught plaintiff's counsel made
the following job offer argument:
"In considering what is an adequate sum for this young man, suppose I was to
meet one of you ladies on the street and I say to you, 'I want to offer you a job and
I want to tell you a little bit about this job before you say you are going to accept it;
one peculiar thing, if you take it you have to keep it for the rest of your life, you
work seven days a week, no vacations, work daytime and night. The other thing is,
you only get paid $3.00 a day. Here is your job-your job is to suffer Mr. Faught's
disability. "'
id. (quoting summation). See note 138 infra.
4 See Crum v. Ward, 146 W.Va. 421, 435, 122 S.E.2d 18, 26-27 (1961). This court indicated its belief that psychological factors, particularly the power of suggestion, enter into the
determination of damages for pain and suffering. Id. The court apparently found that the argument of a dollar a day for pain, for example, would evoke as much sympathy as an appeal to the
golden rule.
The attorney's repeated utterance of the $10 per diem figure serves to instill this number
into the jurors' minds, since rote repetition is one method of memorization. Moreover, this
"forced memorization" technique can be augmented by illustration of the calculations on a
blackboard. See Cox v.Valley Fair Corp., 83 N.J. 381, 416 A.2d 809 (1980) (repetition of phrase
"daily pain" deemed to constitute a component of impermissible per diem formula), Gilborges
v. Wallace, 156 N.J. Super. 121, 379 A.2d 269 (App. Div. 1977) (repetition of word "millions"
deemed improper and prejudicial).
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value of pain without the critical thought that would otherwise
occur.6
Also, the attorney's constant urging of his opinion of the
value of plaintiff's pain impinges upon the jury's province since the
jurors might mistakenly believe his figure is supported by the
evidence.67 Interference of this nature identifies a persuasive argument.
The above discussion highlights the factors distinguishing illustrative and persuasive per diem arguments. Such categorization results
in a workable approach to the issue of whether per diem arguments
should be allowed. Although the courts deciding the issue have not
expressly voiced this distinction, it is not artificial. An examination of
the courts' rationales for permitting and prohibiting per diem arguments, coupled with the attorneys' language used in presenting the
arguments to the juries, reveals the following: those courts permitting
per diem arguments appear generally to be referring to illustrative
arguments; 6 those courts prohibiting per diem arguments, though
the prohibition includes both forms of argument without distinguishing between them, appear generally to be referring to persuasive arguments.69
THE PER DIEM CONTROVERSY
Botta v. Brunner-The Minority View
In the leading case of Botta v. Brunner,"° the New Jersey supreme court presented the first definitive analysis of the per diem
issue 7 and stated the major criticisms of this approach for computing

' See Henne v. Balick, I Del. 369, 376-77, 146 A.2d 394, 398 (1958); Faught v. Washam,
329 S.W.2d 588, 603 (Mo. 1959).
67 See Harper v. Bolton, 239 S.C. 541, 548, 124 S.E.2d 54. 59 (1962).
6 See, e.g., Corkerv v. Greenberg, 253 Iowa 846, 114 N.W.2d 327 (1962)
(per diem argument used as a suggestion or illustration is proper); Yates v. Wenk, 363 Mich. 311, 109 N.W.2d
828 (1961) (acceptable for attorney to evaluate pain on a daily basis for illustrative purposes);
Johnson v. Brown, 75 Nev. 437, 345 P.2d 754 (1959) (per diem arguments may be used for
illustrative purposes only); Edwards v. Lawton, 244 S.C. 276, 136 S.E.2d 708 (1964) (use of per
diem formula for illustrative purposes is not error). See note 83 infra.
See, e.g., Faught v. Washam, 329 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. 1959) (job offer argument-hybrid
per diem argument and golden rule argument); Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713
(1958) (per diem argument coupled with an appeal to the golden rule); Gilborges v. Wallace,
153 N.J. Super. 121, 379 A.2d 269 (1977), affd, 78 N.J. 342, 396 A.2d 338 (1978) (per diem argument and attempt to subliminally suggest one million dollar figure); Henman v. Klinger, 409 P.2d
631 (Wyo. 1966) (per diem argument and appeal to golden rule).
- 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958).
7' Cooper, supra note 4, at 402. See note 3 supra.
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damages for pain and suffering.72 The court's rationale has served as
the focal point of the per diem controversy.'
The plaintiff in Botta sought recovery of personal injury damages
arising from an automobile accident.7" In his summation, plaintiff's
counsel said to the jury: " 'how much do you think you should get for
every day you have to go through that harrowing experience ...
Would fifty cents an hour for that kind of suffering be too high?' 75
The defendant objected and the trial court declared that the argument provided an improper measure of damages for pain and
suffering." The appellate division, reversing the decision of the trial
with prior
court, found that counsel's per diem argument conformed
77
precedent and fell within the fair scope of summation.
The supreme court, in an opinion authored by Justice Francis,
considered both the propriety of using a golden rule argument and
counsel's use of a per diem argument. In holding that counsel's
72 26 N.J. at 92-101, 138 A.2d at 719-24.

7 Cooper, supra note 4, at 402. See notes 8 & 11 supra.
,4 26 N.J. at 86, 138 A.2d at 715. During the course of the trial the extent of Mrs. Botta's
alleged injuries, which included lower back pain, bruises, contusions, and abrasions, Botta v.
Brunner, 42 N.J. Super. 95, 100, 126 A.2d 32, 35 (App. Div. 1956), became a seriously disputed issue. 26 N.J. at 89, 138 A.2d at 716. At the trial's conclusion, the jury returned a verdict
of $5,500. Plaintiff appealed, contending this amount was inadequate, and asserted that the per
diem argument was proper and should have been allowed. Id. at 86-87, 91, 138 A.2d at 715,
717.
7' 26 N.J. at 91-92, 138 A.2d at 717 (quoting summation). In his closing statement, Botta's
attorney made the following argument:
"How much can you give for pain and suffering? As a guide, I try to think of
myself. What would be a minimum that a person is entitled to? And you must place
yourself in the position of this woman. If you add that disability which has been
described to you, and you were wearing this 24 hours a day, how much do you
think you should get for every day you had to go through that harrowing experience, or every hour?
Well, I thought I would use this kind of suggestion. I don't know. It is for you
to determine whether you think I am low or high. Would fifty cents an hour for
that kind of suffering be too high?"
Id. at 91-92, 138 A.2d at 717 (quoting summation). This summation states that fifty cents an
hour is merely a suggestion. It would not, however, constitute an illustrative argument because
this suggestion is coupled with an appeal to the golden rule. See notes 63-64 supra and accompanying text.
76 26 N.J. at 92, 138 A.2d at 117.
' Botta v. Brunner, 42 N.J. Super. 95, 107-08, 126 A.2d 32, 39-40 (App. Div. 1956). The
appellate division, in approving this per diem argument, reasoned that "the fair scope of argument in summation" includes informing the jury of the amount of recovery sought and counsel's
supporting reasoning for that amount. Id. at 107, 126 A.2d at 39. It was concluded that this
settled practice would then support a reference to per diem amounts. The appellate division
also noted that the trial judge can effectively caution the jury that the argument on the amount
of damages is not evidence. Id. at 107-08, 126 A.2d at 39-40. This reasoning was consistent with
that of courts in other jurisdictions which had approved the use of per diem arguments. See
notes 109-23 infra and accompanying text.
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summation was an appeal to the golden rule and therefore improper,
the court stated that jurors are not free to fix compensation according
to what pain and suffering would be worth to them if they had sustained the plaintiff's injuries. 8 Counsel was prohibited from making
this argument because the verdict should be based upon reasonable
compensation,79 not a sympathetic appeal to the jurors so
Although the case could have been disposed of solely on these
grounds, the court, undertaking an extensive examination of the per
diem issue,8" announced the Botta Rule: counsel for plaintiff or
defendant may not suggest to the jury in opening or closing statements, either directly or indirectly, "per hour or per diem sums as
the value of or as compensation for pain, suffering and kindred elements associated with injury and disability."' 2 These suggestions
were characterized as "an unwarranted intrusion into the domain of
the jury." The fundamental assumption underlying the rule was that
"pain and suffering have no known dimensions, mathematical or
financial."" There was no market in which the law of supply and
demand could equate pain and suffering with dollars and cents."5
Thus, the jury's task was to make an impartial judgment and award
reasonable compensation based on the evidence."' The court, in
addition, stated that under no circumstances may the jury be
7826 N.J. at 94, 138 A.2d at 719. For a discussion of the golden rule argument, see text
accompanying notes 32-35 supra.
1126 N.J. at 94, 138 A.2d at 719.
80 Id. at 97, 138 A.2d at 721.
81 Id. at 92-105, 138 A.2d at 718-26. For an evaluation of the case law relied upon by the
Botta court, see articles collected in notes 4, 6 & 8 supra.
8 26 N.J. at 99, 103, 138 A.2d at 722, 725.
" Id. at 103, 138 A.2d at 725. The court suggested the scope of the prohibition it was
promulgating:
But since the nature of the subject matter admits only of the broad concept of
reasonable compensation, may counsel for the plaintiff or the defendant state to the
jury, in opening or closing, his belief as to the pecuniary value or price of pain and
suffering per hour or day or week, and ask that such figure be used as part of a
mathematical formula for calculating the damages to be awarded? Without expressing a personal opinion, may he suggest that the valuation be based on so much per
hour or day or week, or ask the jurors if they do not think the pain and suffering
are fairly worth so much per hour or day or week-and then demonstrate, by
employing such rate as a factor in his computation, that a verdict of a fixed amount
of money would be warranted or could be justified?
Id. at 94-95, 138 A.2d at 719. To these questions the court answered a resounding "no." Id. at
99, 103, 138 A.2d at 722, 725. Note that the first question relates to a persuasive argument and
the second to an illustrative one. The court's. ban of both forms of argument demonstrates the
comprehensiveness of the Botta prohibition.
Id. at 95, 138 A.2d at 720.
Id. at 92-93, 138 A.2d at 718-20.
Id. at 94, 138 A.2d at 719.
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informed of the ad damnum clause by the court, an attorney, or in
any other fashion. 7 The rationale behind this corollary rule was that
even though the jury is instructed to award reasonable compensation,
the suggested figure would consciously or unconsciously influence
their award of damages ss
The foundation of Botta's rationale" involved the interplay of
three elements: the function of the jury; "' the scope of summation; 91
and the administration of the trial.92 Turning to the function of the
jury, the court stated that damages should be deduced from the evidence and not calculated from counsel's proposed figures.' Per diem
arguments, according to the court, suggest figures not based on evidence that become implanted in the minds of the jurors and may
then be substituted for evidence." The resulting influence on the
jury's decision-making process constitutes an invasion of the province
of the jury.5 Further, the court found that instructions to the jury
s7 Id. at 104, 138 A.2d at 725. This part of the court's ruling has been integrated into the
New Jersey Court Rules, which provide that a party demanding unliquidated damages shall not
specify an amount. N.J. CT. R. 4:5-2.
8826 N.J. at 104, 138 A.2d at 725. To give the rule "its full and intended scope," the Botta
court expressly overruled a number of decisions which approved counsel's references to the
amount of money damages sought. Id. at 103-04, 138 A.2d at 725. Justice Wachenfeld dissented
from this portion of the majority opinion. He reasoned that these long-standing practices had
not resulted in inequities or difficulties which required correction, and would have limited the
holding to a prohibition of the per diem approach without disturbing counsel's right to suggest a
lump sum for the injuries. Id. at 105, 138 A.2d at 726 (Wachenfeld, J., dissenting in part). For
a discussion of how other jurisdictions solved a similar conflict between their established practices and the per diem approach, see notes 114-16, 133-35 infra and accompanying text.
Legal scholars analyzing the Botta decision have reached differing conclusions about what
constitutes its underlying rationale. Compare Recent Cases, 12 RUTGERS L. REv. 522 (1958)
(absence of evidentiary basis for converting pain and suffering into dollars and cents) with Carton, Justice Francis and the Botta Rule-A Continuing Controversy, 24 RUTGERs L. REV. 443
(1970) (inability to formularize pain and suffering). This disagreement has contributed to the
myriad of positions taken by the courts on the per diem issue. See Cooper, supra note 4, at
404-11.
90 26 N.J. at 97-99, 138 A.2d at 721-23.
1 Id. at 100-01, 138 A.2d at 723.
9
Id. at 101, 138 A.2d at 723-24.
13 Id. at 97-99, 138 A.2d at 721-22.
11 Id. at 98-99, 138 A.2d at 722.
Id. at 98-99, 103, 138 A.2d at 722, 725. In Purpora v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 53
N.J. Super. 475, 147 A.2d 591 (App. Div. 1959), the appellate division clarified Botta's premise
that a monetary suggestion improperly influences the jury. During summation, Purpora's attorney commented that the plaintiff deserved " 'a high amount in five figures' " for his injury. He
also referred to Public Service as " 'a big corporation worth a lot of money.' " Id. at 479, 147
A.2d at 593 (quoting summation). The jury subsequently returned a verdict of $3,424 for the
plaintiff. The defendant appealed, charging that counsel's remarks were improper and the verdict excessive. Id. at 477-78, 147 A.2d at 592. The appellate division, finding the remarks
improper, held that prejudice existed even though the jury did not return a five-figure verdict.
Id. at 479, 481, 147 A.2d at 593, 595. The court stated that under Botta prejudice results from
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that per diem arguments are not based on evidence were inadequate
to remove the figures from the jurors' minds." Thus, as in the case
of the ad damnum clause, the award would reflect the influence of
the suggested figures.97
The Botta court next focused on the scope of permissible
summation. In Justice Francis' opinion, suggestions about the monetary value of pain have no evidentiary foundation." 8 Since no witness
or expert is competent to estimate the amount of pain experienced
per hour or per day, 99 it would be anomalous to allow counsel's per
diem estimation to be considered as evidence by the jury. Therefore,
the Justice concluded that any suggestion by counsel that places a
dollar value on pain is necessarily speculative and outside the scope
of permissible summation."
The third element of the Botta rationale concerned fair administration of the trial. The court asserted that both parties should have
an equal opportunity to offer proofs and to argue based on those
proofs. ' Per diem arguments, however, present speculative valuations as evidence.1' If defense counsel suggests his own per diem
sums, he is engaging in the same speculation as plaintiff's counsel,
yet his failure to respond could be interpreted by the jury as tacit
approval of plaintiff's counsel's suggestions. 10'3 These arguments
thereby deny defense counsel an opportunity for adequate
rebuttal.' °4 Justice Francis implied that a great injustice to the
defendant is that effective use of per diem valuations for pain and
suffering could result in "'monstrous verdicts."'05
the influence exerted on the jurors' minds, not from their acceptance of the suggested figures.
Id. at 481, 147 A.2d at 595. No decision was reached as to whether a trial judge could in some
manner remove the prejudicial impact of such statements. In fact, in Purpora, the prejudice
was actually heightened by the trial court's failure to admonish counsel or instruct the jury to
ignore the improper remarks. id. at 482, 147 A.2d at 595.
26 N.J. at 98, 138 A.2d at 722.
'3 Id. at 97-99, 138 A.2d at 721-22.
9 Id. at 100-01, 138 A.2d at 723.
Id. at 100, 138 A.2d at 723. A number of articles, however, have discussed the possibility
of using experimental and clinical methods of measuring pain in personal injury cases. E.g.,
Olender, Proof and Evaluation of Pain and Suffering in Personal Injury Litigation, 1962 DUKE
L.J. 344; Peck, Compensationfor Pain: A Reappraisal in Light of New Medical Evidence, 24
DEF.

L.J. 219 (1975).

,00 26 N.J. at 100-01, 138 A.2d at 723.
10' Id. at 101, 138 A.2d at 723-24.
102Id.
10

Id.

Id. But see notes 275 & 281 infra and accompanying text.
" See 26 N.J. at 102, 138 A.2d at 724 (quoting Ahlstrom v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault
Ste. M. BR.., 244 Minn. 1, 30, 68 N.W.2d 873, 891 (1955)). It has been stated that the purpose
of the Botta Rule and its progeny in other jurisdictions is to prevent excessive verdicts. See
'0
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Botta Rebutted-Beagle v. Vasold
The California Supreme Court in Beagle v. Vasold, l° "align[ing]
itself with the majority of jurisdictions," held that an attorney may
argue per diem formulas for pain and suffering. 7 Justice Mosk authored a persuasive opinion answering many of the contentions raised
by the Botta decision of some eight years earlier. He also presented
workable solutions to some of the basic problems underlying the per
diem controversy. "
Addressing the Botta court's contention that per diem arguments
lack an evidentiary basis, Justice Mosk asserted that evidence presented at trial would support a per diem suggestion.'" He reasoned
that the suggested per diem sums can be inferred from both the
jury's observation of the plaintiff and expert testimony about the nature and extent of the injuries. "l The jury must infer a total dollar
amount from what it observes and hears at trial; the same evidence
will support the attorney's inference concerning a total amount."' Justice Mosk rejected the argument that although damages in total can
be inferred from the evidence, the inference vanishes when the "sum
Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d 166, 178, 417 P.2d 673, 679, 53 Cal. Rptr. 129, 135 (1966);
Cooper, supra note 4, at 366; Recent Cases, 28 U. CIN. L. REV. 138, 142 (1958). This arguably
is not true. In Botta, where a per diem formula was used, the defendant did not challenge the
verdict as excessive; instead, the plaintiff appealed the $5,500 verdict as inadequate. 26 N.J. at
86-87, 138 A.2d at 715. Nonetheless, a Botta Rule violation was found on the grounds of impermissible influence on the jurors' minds. Id. at 103, 138 A.2d at 725. Because the court found a
violation without finding an excessive verdict, the prevention of excessive verdicts could not
have been the court's purpose. Rather, the court's major concern was to prevent impermissible
influence on the jurors. Id. at 99, 103, 138 A.2d at 722, 725.
It would be error to conclude, however, that the court was not concerned with large
verdicts. The court viewed "monstrous verdicts" as a potential result of utilizing per diem
arguments. Id. at 102, 318 A.2d at 724. This concern surfaced in Cox where the court did not
consider excessiveness as a result, but viewed the size of the verdict as an indicator of impermissible influence arising from a per diem argument. 83 N.J. at 386, 416 A.2d at 812.
1- 65 Cal. 2d 166, 417 P.2d 673, 53 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1966).
10"Id. at 175, 182, 417 P.2d at 677, 682, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 133, 138. In Beagle the plaintiff
argued on appeal that the verdict was inadequate because his attorney was not permitted to
present a per diem formula for damages. The court agreed and, based on the evidence, found
that $1,719.48 was an inadequate figure for plaintiff's permanent disability and severe pain. It
concluded that plaintiff probably would have been awarded a larger verdict had the trial court
not limited counsel's agrument. The court held that the trial judge had improperly restricted
the argument, and therefore reversed the judgment. Id. at 170-71, 183, 417 P.2d at 674-75,
682, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 130-31, 138. See note 105 supra.
11 65 Cal. 2d at 179-81, 417 P.2d at 680-81, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 136-37.
'0
Id. at 176-77, 417 P.2d at 678, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 134. See note 98 supra and accompanying
text.
"' 65 Cal. 2d at 176-77, 417 P.2d at 678, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
.. Id. One commentator has asserted that evidence presented at trial can provide a basis for
per diem valuation. The injured party testifies to the number of hours of pain per day and its
changes in intensity, and the defense counsel cross-examines plaintiff in an effort to reduce the

1981]

COMMENTS

is divided into segments representing days, months or years." 112 Disagreeing with the Botta court's finding that per diem arguments are
speculative because they lack an evidentiary basis, he concluded that
these arguments are inferable from the evidence and are therefore
permissible. 13
Justice Mosk also indicated that many courts which traditionally
allow counsel to inform the jury of the amount claimed, or to argue
for a total monetary amount, find it logically inconsistent to prohibit
the use of per diem arguments." 4 These courts find no greater harm
in exposing the jury to a sum "fragmented to represent periods of
time," than to a total amount for the plaintiff's life expectancy.1
Suggesting a per diem sum is deemed to be no more speculative than
suggesting a total amount."'
Answering Botta's invasion of the jury's province contention, Justice Mosk examined the impact of per diem summations on the jury's
decision-making process." 7 He compared the effect of arguing the
per diem method of computing damages to that of urging the jury to
find the defendant negligent."' When an attorney discusses a
defendant's conduct and the reasonable inferences therefrom, no one
contends that the jury abdicates its duty to apply the reasonable man
standard. Why then, Justice Mosk queried, should the jury upon
hearing an argument for the dollar per day technique, be presumed

amount of time suffered. Therefore, sufficient evidence is offered on the segmentation of pain.
Phillips, supra note 6, at 85-86. Furthermore, other proponents of the per diem approach have
asserted that an attorney has always been allowed to discuss issues which are not part of the
evidentiary basis of the record, such as credibility of the witnesses or negligence of the defendant. Thus, they maintain that the per diem argument falls within that class of issues which may
be discussed without having a basis in evidence. Cooper, supra note 4, at 406.
112 65 Cal. 2d at 176-77, 417 P.2d at 678, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
13 Id. Justice Mosk further noted that a court could control any unwarranted inferences from
evidence by its power to contain argument within legitimate bounds. Id. at 177, 417 P.2d at
678, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
114 Id. at 177, 417 P.2d at 679, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 135. Two approaches to the "logical inconsistency" dilemma have arisen. The Botta court, in recognition of the dilemma, overruled prior
precedent permitting reference to a total amount. 26 N.J. at 103-04, 138 A.2d at 725. Similarly,
although it found Botta persuasive, the Nevada Supreme Court was compelled by a desire for
consistency to permit per diem arguments based upon Nevada's long standing practice of informing the jury of that ad damnum clause. Johnson v. Brown, 75 Nev. 437, 446-47, 345 P.2d
754, 759 (1959).
"5 65 Cal. 2d at 177-78, 417 P.2d at 679, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
Id. Moreover, the jury's verdict has the "same speculative quality" to the extent that it
contains an amount for pain and suffering as a suggestion of the total amount or per diem sum.
Yates v. Wenk, 363 Mich. 311, 318, 109 N.W.2d 828, 831 (1961).
1I 65 Cal. 2d at 177, 417 P.2d at 678-79, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 134-35. See notes 93-97 supra and
accompanying text.
18 65 Cal. 2d at 177, 417 P.2d at 678-79, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 134-35.
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as a matter of law to ignore the court's instruction to award reasonable compensation and to "slavishly follow counsel's suggestions on
damages?" "' The jury is instructed that it is "the ultimate judge of
the inferences" drawn from the evidence; it should be presumed that
the jury will act accordingly. Thus, Justice Mosk concluded that an
attorney's assertion "that damages be measured on a segmented
basis" does not invade the province of the jury. 2 '
Justice Mosk also rejected the Botta court's contention that per
diem arguments impede the fair administration of justice.'21 He
noted that a per diem argument "is a double-edged sword" which can
be used to present alternative per diem values and to expose exaggeration in the plaintiff's proposal.122 Thus, a defendant is not disadvantaged by the per diem technique.'23
AN OVERVIEW OF THE BOTTA RULE
IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A majority of jurisdictions have approved the use of per diem
arguments.124 There may, however, be restrictions on the right to
argue and the form of argument. Some courts permit attorneys to use
the per diem approach as a matter of right. 2 5 Other jurisdictions
place the use of per diem arguments within the discretion of the trial
judge based on his traditional control of counsel's argument to the
jury. 26 Frequently, use of a per diem formula is limited to illustrative arguments. 7
ji9

Id.

Id. Where per diem arguments are permitted at the discretion of the trial court, the judge
determines whether a particular argument invades the province of the jury. Johnson v. Brown,
75 Nev. 437, 447, 345 P.2d 754, 759 (1959). This direct control over potential interference with
the jury's decision-making process is a principal reason why some courts permit per diem arguments subject to this procedural limitation. See cases collected in note 126 infra.
"1 65 Cal. 2d at 181, 417 P.2d at 681, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 137. See notes 101-05 supra and
accompanying text.
11 65 Cal. 2d at 181, 417 P.2d at 681, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
'2

1

Id.

Id. at 173-75, 417 P.2d at 676-77, 53 Cal. Rptr. 132-33. See cases collected in Annot., 3
A.L.R.4th 940 (1981). This annotation supercedes Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1347 (1958 & Supplements 1976 & 1980).
11 E.g., Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d at 182, 417 P.2d at 682, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 138: Corkery
v. Greenberg, 253 Iowa 846, 854-55, 114 N.W.2d 327, 332 (1962); Yates v. Wenk, 363 Mich.
311, 318-19, 109 N.W.2d 828, 831 (1961); Worsley v. Corcelli, 377 A.2d 215, 219 (R.I. 1977).
l' E.g., Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So.2d 82, 89 (Fla. Dis. Ct. App. 1959); Johnson v. Brown,
75 Nev. 437, 447, 345 P.2d 754, 759 (1959); Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 11 Utah 2d
23, 25-26, 354 P.2d 575, 576 (1960); Jones v. Hogan, 56 Wash. 2d 28, 32, 351 P.2d 153, 159
(1960). This comment will not treat the "discretionary approach" to per diem arguments separately. It should be noted, however, that the limitations on form, the supporting rationale, and
the safeguards that will be discussed infra also apply to this approach.
127 E.g., Newbury v. Vogel, 151 Colo. 520, 526-27, 379 P.2d 811, 814 (1963). Corkery v.
Greenberg, 253 Iowa 846, 855, 114 N.W.2d 327, 332 (1962); Christy v. Saliterman, 288 Minn.
"A
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Many courts, recognizing the difficulty of converting pain and
suffering into dollars and cents, reason that juries need practical
guidelines to ascertain unliquidated damages.a" Per diem arguments,
in their opinion, may provide necessary assistance by suggesting a
"course of reasoning" or illustrating a method for computing
damages." 9 Moreover, there are sufficient safeguards to prevent any
prejudicial effects resulting from the use of the per diem approach."3
A minority of states have adopted 131 and maintained the Botta
position on per diem arguments.'32 Most of the courts that follow the
Botta Rule have not adopted its corollary rule which prohibits
arguing the ad damnum clause or a total monetary amount for pain
and suffering.3
Some of these courts have reasoned that a suggested

144, 169-70, 179 N.W.2d 288, 304 (1970); Johnson v. Brown, 75 Nev. 437, 447, 345 P.2d 754,
759 (1959); Edwards v. Lawton, 244 S.C. 276, 281, 136 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1964). For a discussion
of the illustrative approach, see notes 54-62 supra and accompanying text.
128 E.g., Newbury v. Vogel, 151 Colo. 520, 526-27, 379 P.2d 811, 814 (1963); Corkery v.
Greenberg, 253 Iowa 846, 855, 114 N.W.2d 327, 332 (1962); Worsley v. Corcelli, 377 A.2d 215,
219 (R.I. 1977).
9 E.g., Newbury v. Vogel, 151 Colo. 520, 526-27, 379 P.2d 811, 814 (1963); Corkery v.
Greenberg, 253 Iowa 846, 855, 114 N.W.2d 327, 332 (1962); Yates v. Wenk, 363 Mich. 311,
318-19, 109 N.W.2d 828, 831 (1961); Worsley v. Corcelli, 377 A.2d 215, 219 (R.I. 1977).
" Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d at 180-81, 417 P.2d at 680-81, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 136-37; Yates
v. Wenk, 363 Mich. 311, 318, 109 N.W.2d 828, 831 (1961); Worsley v. Corcelli, 377 A.2d 215,
219 (R.I. 1977). For a discussion of safeguards used with per diem arguments, see notes 273-79
infra and accompanying text.
" Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d at 173-75, 417 P.2d at 676-77, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 332-33. See
Carton, supra note 5, at 455; cases collected Annot., 3 A.L.R.4th 940 (1981) (superceding
Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1347 (1958 & Supplements 1976 & 1980)). In analyzing the per diem
issue, most of these courts focused upon the issues raised in Botta, including lack of evidentiary
basis for per diem arguments, invasion of the province of the jury, and fair administration of the
trial. E.g., Caylor v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 190 Kan. 261, 374 P.2d 53 (1962);
Crum v. Ward, 146 W. Va. 421, 122 S.E.2d 18 (1961). In addition, some courts contended that
formulas were inherently misleading because they created an "illusion of certainty." E.g., Caley
v. Manicke, 24 I11.2d 390, 393, 182 N.E.2d 206, 208 (1962). Other courts were concerned that
jurors might be confused by deliberate manipulation of time periods and dollar values, and
consequently return excessive awards. Duguay v. Gelinas, 104 N.H. 182, 185-87, 182 A.2d 451,
453-54 (1962).
" For a discussion of cases that have modified the Botta Rule, see notes 136-58 infra and
accompanying text.
" E.g., Caley v. Manicke, 24 I11.2d 390, 394, 182 N.E.2d 206, 209 (1962); Graeff v. Baptist
Temple, 576 S.W.2d 291, 302 (Mo. 1978); Faught v. Washam, 329 S.W.2d 588, 602 (Mo. 1959);
Duguay v. Gelinas, 104 N.H. 182, 187, 182 A.2d 451, 454 (1962); Halsted v. Kosnar, 18 Wis.
2d 348, 351-52, 118 N.W.2d 864, 866 (1963). Compare cases collected in Annot., 3 A.L.R.4th
940 (1981) and Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1347 (1958 & Supplements 1976 & 1980) (superceded)
(deciding whether to permit per diem arguments) with cases collected in Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d
541 (1967 & Supplement 1980) (deciding whether to permit reference to ad damnum clause or
lump sum amount). Consider the discussion of Botta's rationale for prohibiting reference to the
ad damnum clause in notes 87 & 88 supra and accompanying text.
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total amount is "far less misleading" than a per diem figure; ' others
have relied upon a statewide practice of permitting argument of the
total amount.'35
Several jurisdictions that initially followed the Botta Rule have
chosen to limit its application. 316 These courts have allowed arguments that exceed the bounds of the rule-arguments ranging from
the suggestion of a dollar amount for a particular time period provided that period is not reduced to one day, to permitting an illustrative argument which is clearly per diem in form but used only as a
suggestion.

In Graeff v. Baptist Temple, 3 7 decided in 1978, the Missouri
Supreme Court held that counsel's argument suggesting lump sums
for specific periods including hospitalization, time in a cast, pain and
suffering from the injury's occurrence to the time of the trial, and
future pain and suffering did not violate their prohibition of per diem
arguments. 3 ' According to the court, counsel's argument merely
suggested a lump sum for each time period without segmenting the
periods into per hour or per day units.' 39 In light of the finding that
" E.g., Caley v. Manicke, 24 I11.
2d 390, 394, 182 N.E.2d 206, 209 (1962) (far less misleading); Caylor v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 190 Kan. 261, 264, 374 P.2d 53, 55 (1962)
(far less misleading).
1" E.g., Graeff v. Baptist Temple, 576 S.W.2d 291, 302 (Mo. 1978) (custom and practice);
Duguay v. Gelinas, 104 N.H. 182, 187, 182 A.2d 451, 454 (1962) (custom and practice). Recall
that some jurisdictions permit per diem arguments precisely because they are considered a
logical extension of the practice of arguing a total monetary amount. See notes 114-16 supra and
accompanying text.
" This discussion is not intended to be an exhaustive examination of the Botta Rule in other
jurisdictions. The cases presented here highlight the New Jersey supreme court's expansion of
the Botta Rule in Cox v. Valley Fair Corp., 83 N.J. 381, 416 A.2d 809 (1980). See text accompanying notes 219 & 235-37 infra.
137 576 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1978).
lZ Id. at 303. The Missouri Supreme Court in 1959 adopted the Botta prohibition in Faught
v. Washam, 329 S.W.2d 588, 603 (Mo. 1959). The court refused to permit a job offer argument
in which the attorney offered the jurors the job of suffering plaintiff's disability for three dollars
a day. Id. at 601-02. The court held that the job offer argument was improper because it was an
appeal to the golden rule and suggested the use of a mathematical formula. Id. at 602, 604.
Moreover, the job offer technique was considered particularly unfair because it preyed upon the
"'motivating emotions and besetting frailties of the courts, counsel and jurors."
Id. at 604. In
subsequent Missouri cases, arguments bordering on the per diem technique were not deemed
improper unless the defendant contended that the verdict was excessive. These courts reasoned
that errors in argument concerning the computation of damages related to the size of the verdict, and therefore, could not be deemed prejudicial absent a claim of excessiveness. McCormick v. Smith, 459 S.W. 2d 272, 278 (Mo. 1970); Chambers v. City of Kansas City, 446 S.W.
2d 833, 841 (Mo. 1969); Ricketts v. Kansas City Stockyards, 537 S.W.2d 613, 623 (Mo. App.
1976).
"1 576 S.W.2d at 303. The Graeff court distinguished between "pure per diem" arguments
in which a monetary value for pain is applied to a unit of time, and the lump sum and job offer
approaches in which there are no strict per diem computations. The job offer argument was
disapproved, however, because it included an appeal to the golden rule. Id. at 302.
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the verdict was not excessive, the Graeff court could not be persuaded that the lump sum per period argument was prejudicial even
though the verdict returned was identical to the maximum amount
suggested.'
Thus, Graeff demonstrates that where a total dollar
amount is suggested for a span of time as opposed to a unit of time,
and the resulting verdict is not excessive, there is no per diem violation under the Missouri prohibition.
In the three cases that follow, Botta Rule courts in different
jurisdictions have permitted "illustrative" per diem arguments and
thereby eroded the Botta Rule. An Illinois appellate court modified
that state's per diem prohibition in Warp v. Whitmore.' The court
in Warp did not find reversible error where counsel's argument
merely suggested a per diem formula but did not imply that it was
the only or the correct method for computing damages. 142 There, the
attorney suggested $100 a year over the remaining life expectancy for
plaintiff's pain and suffering."I He indicated that based on the jury's
view of reasonable compensation, the suggested figures might "be
high or low." 1" The court reasoned that the absence of an objection
by the defense attorney and the failure of plaintiff's attorney to challenge his adversary "to offer a better 'scheme' for [determining] . . .
damages" supported its finding of no error. 4 s As in previous Illinois
appellate decisions, the court approved this "illustrative" line of
reasoning."' If the Illinois Supreme Court follows this line of appellate cases, its acceptance of illustrative per diem arguments would
overrule that court's former prohibition of mathematical formulas.
" Id. at 303-04. The Graeff court's conclusion concerning the size of the verdict issue should
be compared with the New Jersey supreme court's ruling in Cox where the court found that a
large verdict, although not excessive, indicated impermissible influence on the minds of the
jurors. 83 N.J. at 386, 416 A.2d at 812. See notes 204-05 infra and accompanying text.
141 123 Il.
App. 2d 157, 260 N.E.2d 45 (1970). In Caley v. Manicke, 24 I11. 2d 390, 182
N.E.2d 206 (1962) the Illinois Supreme Court prohibited the use of per diem arguments and
indicated that illustrative arguments were no less harmful. It noted that use of a cautionary
instruction with an illustrative argument would not cure its misleading effect. Id. at 393-94, 182
N.E.2d at 208-09. Further, the court suggested that the jury could better determine reasonable
compensation without being fettered by an attorney's partisan views on the value of pain. Id.
The accepted practice of counsel suggesting a total monetary award was not affected by the per
diem prohibition, since it was considered "far less misleading" than use of formula arguments.
Id. at 394, 182 N.E.2d at 209.
" 123 I11. App. 2d at 164, 260 N.E.2d at 49.
14

Id.

Id.
Id.
'" See id. See, e.g., Fortner v. McDermott, 1 111. App. 3d 358, 367-68, 272 N.E.2d 503, 510
(1971). Cf. Fintak v. Catholic Bishop, 51 111. App. 3d 191, 198, 366 N.E.2d 480, 485 (1977)
(limiting instruction given, harmless error due to lack of excessive verdict). In Fintak, the
appellate court acknowledged that it was improper "to urge a per diem formula for computing
damages." 51 111. App. 3d at 198, 366 N.E.2d at 485. However, citing Warp and Fortnerwith
'"

14
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In 1965, the Supreme Court of Hawaii ruled that per diem arguments were improper and prohibited them." 7 The legislature subsequently promulgated a statute allowing attorneys to argue "in terms
of suggested formulas for the computation of damages or by way of
other illustration."'s Five years after the first decision, the Hawaii
supreme court, in Barretto v. Akan, was presented with the conflict
between the aforementioned statute and its prior proscription against
the per diem approach.1 4' The defendant in Barretto challenged the
statute as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. The Hawaii
court, however, did not reach the constitutional question, choosing
instead to overrule that part of the previous opinion prohibiting the
use of formula arguments." ° The court expressed confidence in the
jury's ability to recognize veracity and reasonableness in exercising its
function of weighing and reconciling conflicting evidence arising from
the use of the per diem approach. "'Consequently,
the court
approved the use of the illustrative technique when accompanied by
a cautionary instruction.'52
The Wyoming Supreme Court adopted the Botta Rule'3 in a
case involving a "persuasive" per diem argument."
In a later case,
approval, the court found no reversible error where the attorney had merely suggested a per
diem formula, and the trial court had given a limiting instruction after sustaining defense counsel's objection to the argument. Id. In addition, the court found that since the verdict was not
excessive in light of the injuries proven, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding
that the error did not result in prejudice. Id.
147 Franco v. Fujimoto, 47 Hawaii 408, 418-20, 390 P.2d 740, 747-48 (1964). The Fujimoto
court did not follow Botta's prohibition against informing the jury of the ad damnum clause. It
found that the sole purpose of the ad damnum clause was to inform the jury of the amount
sought and not to affect the jurors' reasoning process. Id. at 442, 390 P.2d at 748-49. Consider
Botta's rationale for prohibiting reference to the ad damnum clause, see notes 87 & 88 supra
and accompanying text.
"

HAWAI

REV.

STAT.

§ 635-52. In sum, the statute provided for suggestion or illustration of

formulas and argument of the total amount expected by the plaintiff. Id.
149 51 Hawaii 383, 463 P.2d 917 (1969).
1-0Id. at 387, 393, 463 P.2d at 920, 923.
'5' Id. at 394, 463 P.2d at 923. A typical conflict arising under the per diem approach would
involve plaintiff's and defendant's attorneys presenting differing estimates of the value of pain,
the time suffered, or the effect of analgesics on the injured party.
'5
Id., 463 P.2d at 923-24. The Barretto court maintained that a judge's charge to the jury
provides a sufficient safeguard against possible prejudice arising from the per diem approach.
Id. Barretto exemplifies the typical approach to allowing per diem arguments which is to permit
illustrative arguments when accompanied by a cautionary instruction. See notes 56 & 127 supra.
11 Henman v. Klinger, 409 P.2d 631, 633 (Wyo. 1966). The Henman court concluded that
the Botta Rule was "better suited to safeguard the fundamentals of a fair trial of the factual issue
of reasonable compensation .. .and [did] not serve unduly to restrain the prerogatives of counsel to argue all legitimate inferences . . . from the evidence." Id.
lu In Henman v. Klinger, 409 P.2d 631 (Wyo. 1966), the following persuasive argument was
presented:
"[Tihis man was hurt and hurt horribly and he was in excruciating pain and most of
the time it was indescribable pain, and he was in the hospital for seventy days
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Combined Insurance of America v. Sinclair, " the attorney argued
that a monetary value could be placed on suffering when he suggested:
"[A] physician ...was paid one hundred seventy-six dollars to
stop pain during the operation. . . .Now that is what he charged.
And you have to make that decision. This pain, what is it worth, a

dollar a day, a dollar a week?"

'

The court held that while counsel's remarks "[came] seriously close to
infringing upon the 'unit of time' argument, they [fell] somewhat
short."'
Since the attorney clearly suggested a per diem formula of
"a dollar a day" or "a dollar a week," it may be argued that
the
Sinclair court differentiated between an impermissible persuasive
argument and a permissible illustrative one rather than per diem versus non per diem. "
The courts in Warp, Barretto, and Sinclair have modified the
Botta Rule in their respective jurisdictions by permitting arguments
which are beyond the spirit if not the literal bounds of the rule, thus
eroding the Botta principle to such an extent that it is no longer a
viable prohibition to the per diem method. The New Jersey courts,
however, have taken the opposite approach when presented with an
opportunity to reexamine the scope of the rule. 59
THE NEW JERSEY APPROACH
The Botta Rule As Applied
The Botta decision has been followed, for the most part, in subsequent New Jersey decisions." In Cross v. Robert E. Lamb Co., 6 l
....
[W]hat would you take in money for seventy days in the hospital in this kind
of pain? . .. I don't know what you would take for it, but I am going to say in this
case the evidence is of such a nature that you could award $200.00 a day for that
seventy days."
Id. at 632 (quoting summation). The court noted that this statement contained a clear appeal to
the golden rule and violated the prohibition against per diem arguments. Id. at 632-34. For a
discussion of "persuasive" per diem arguments, see notes 63-67 supra and accompanying text.
' 584 P.2d 1034 (Wyo. 1978).
Id. at 1050 (quoting summation).
' Id. In addition, the Sinclair court reasoned that since the verdict was not excessive, the
jury was not impermissibly roused to "passion and prejudice by the argument." Id. at 1051. The
court also indicated that defense counsel, after objecting to the argument, should have asked
the trial judge to admonish the jury to disregard the statement. Id. at 1050-51.
'1 See id. at 1050; text accompanying notes 68-69 supra; notes 54-67 supra and accompanying text.
19 See text accompanying notes 219 & 235-37 infra.
160See Carton, supra note 5, at 448 n.24, for a collection of cases applying the Botta Rule.
.6 60 N.J. Super. 53, 158 A.2d 359 (App. Div. 1960), certif. denied, 32 N.J. 350, 160 A.2d
847 (1960).
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however, the appellate division authorized a blackboard illustration of
damages arguably beyond the scope of the Botta Rule and in so doing
mitigated the effect of the rule.' 62 The attorney listed plaintiff's life
expectancy in years, weeks, and days. Past and future lost earnings
were computed and totaled. The past pain and suffering entry stated
the number of days from the accident to the trial with a blank for the
dollar total. The future pain and suffering notation indicated that the
plaintiff should receive one lump sum for the remainder of his life and
had a blank for the total. " On appeal, the defendant contended that the
blackboard argument with its references to figures and computations
resulted in an inflated verdict. 6 ' The appellate division held that
counsel's blackboard argument did not connote a per diem formula
for pain and suffering. 6 Thus, listing plaintiff's life expectancy in
days and weeks together with an entry for pain and suffering did not
162 Id. at 76-77, 158 A.2d at 371-72. See notes 222-24 infra and accompanying text. Blackboards are frequently used by attorneys for explanation, specification and argument. 60 N.J.
Super. at 73, 158 A.2d at 370. Generally, attorneys can write on a blackboard whatever they
can "argue as a legitimate interpretation of or inference from the evidence." Id. at 75, 158 A.2d
at 371. Any figures used, however, must have some evidentiary basis. Id. at 75, 158 A.2d at
371. According to Cross, states following the Botta Rule do not allow dollar figures for pain and
suffering to be written on blackboards. Since pain cannot be translated into dollars, such figures
lack a basis in evidence. Id., 158 A.2d at 370-71.
1'3 60 N.J. Super. at 73, 158 A.2d at 370. Plaintiff's counsel drew the following chart on the
blackboard during his argument:

HOWARD CROSS10/17/17-41-Exp. 30.29 yrs. = 1575 wks. = 11,000 days
Age 65-23/2 yrs.
$4.25
$4.25
-2.50
-2.75
$1.75 less

$1.50 less
Medical expenses
Lost wages 142 days @ $32.00

$ 587.00
4,544.00
$5,131.00

Pain and suffering
to present 485 days

$

Future:
$1.75 x 40 = $70 x 52 = $3640 less
$1.50 x 40 = $60 x 52 = $3120 less
$3640 per year x 30 years =
$3120 per year X 30 years =
$3640 per year X 23V2 years =
$3120 per year X 23V2 years =
Pain and suffering, for rest of lifeone lump sum.
Id.
Id. at 72-73, 158 A.2d at 370.
1 Id. at 76-77, 158 A.2d at 371-72.
"

per year
per year
$109,200.00
$ 93,200.00
$ 85,540.00
$ 72,320.00
$
$
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suggest that the jury decide on an amount per day or per week and
multiply that figure by the number of days or weeks of life
expectancy.' 66 The Cross court found that the references were not
prejudicial because the chart suggested no dollar unit or total figures
for pain and suffering.'67 Although some entries might have reminded the jury that the plaintiff had suffered for 485 days since the
accident and would continue to suffer, this effect was permissible because the existence and permanency of the plaintiff's pain could have
Moreover, since it was proper to
been inferred from the evidence."
show the jury the plaintiff's life expectancy in terms of years, the
court found no prejudicial effect in translating that expectancy into
days or weeks.' 69 Counsel had merely told the jury what it could
calculate for itself. 170 The Cross holding was arguably beyond the
scope of the Botta Rule because the court approved the illustration of
an argument in which the time periods for pain and suffering were
segmented into days. 17
More recently, the Botta Rule was reaffirmed by a New Jersey
supreme court decision upholding the reversal of a one million dollar
verdict. In Gilborges v. Wallace,172 the infant plaintiff was catastrophically injured when the car in which she was a passenger collided with a truck. 73 The Gilborges' attorney, in his closing statement, commented that a movie provides two hours of entertainment
for three, four, or five dollars, but " '[h]ow much is one hour of pain
and suffering worth?' "174 He continued his argument by alluding to
large jury verdicts in urban areas as opposed to notoriously small verdicts in rural areas such as Burlington County. 75 In addition, the
attorney repeatedly used the word "millions" in relation to plaintiff's
I

Id.

107

Id.
Id.

1 Id. N.J. CT. R. 1:13-5 provides that "[tihe tables of mortality and life expectancy printed
as an Appendix to these rules shall be admissible in evidence as prima facie proof of the facts
therein contained." id. The table of mortality, stated in terms of years, is a general guide for
the jury which must exercise its discretion in estimating the expected length of the plaintiff's
life. Kappovich v. LeWinter, 43 N.J. Super. 528, 532-33, 129 A.2d 299, 301 (App. Div. 1957).
170 60 N.J. Super. at 76-77, 158 A.2d at 371-72.
171 See Carton, supra note 5, at 452 n.44; notes 220-27 infra and accompanying text,
1 153 N.J. Super. 121, 379 A.2d 269 (App. Div. 1977), aff'd in part, 78 N.J. 342, 396 A.2d

338 (1978).
173 153 N.J. Super. at 126, 379 A.2d at 271. Rosemarie Gilborges, age sixteen, was totally
paralyzed and suffered severe brain damage due to the automobile accident. Her parents, as
guardians ad litem, subsequently sued multiple defendants for her injuries. Id.
174 Id. at 140, A.2d at 278 (quoting summation). The attorney then related the value of an
hour of suffering to the determination of "'reasonable and adequate compensation'' for
plaintiff's injuries. Id.
5 Id. at 141, 379 A.2d at 279.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:461

injuries. 176 Finally, after discussing the parents' emotional loss, he
asked the jurors if they knew what that loss was worth." The jury
awarded the plaintiff one million dollars for her injuries.'78
The appellate division held that counsel's summation violated the
Botta Rule " and reversed the verdict."s The attorney's attempt to
equate the price of pain per hour with the cost of a movie ticket was
held to constitute an indirect suggestion of a per diem formula.'' The
court, in its analysis, focused upon the attorney's conscious intent to
influence the jury impermissibly which was evidenced in part by his
attempt to suggest subliminally a one million dollar figure to the
The court relied heavily on the attorney's lecture, given after
jury.'
the trial, on his "one million dollar summation.""
176 Id. at 142, 379 A.2d at 279.

Id., 379 A.2d at 280.
i7 Id. at 126-27, 379 A.2d at 271, 272.
179 Id. at 140-41, 379 A.2d at 279.
1soId. at 143, 379 A.2d at 280. The case was remanded for a new trial on the issue of
damages. Id. The appellate division reviewed the questionable summation, notwithstanding the
lack of objection to it at trial, because the Gilborges' closing statements clearly violated judicially promulgated standards of propriety concerning argument, including the Botta Rule. Id. at
139-41, 379 A.2d at 278-79. The court cautioned attorneys that modeling their closing arguments after the Gilborges summation could result in an injured plaintiff losing a deserved verdict. Id. at 140, 379 A.2d at 278. It also noted that although the Gilborges' attorney's remarks
may have been motivated by a desire to zealously represent his client, they were nonetheless,
"unnecessary and prejudicial." Id.
181Id. at 140-41, 379 A.2d at 279. The appellate division's description of the movie ticket
comment, as "an oblique, but nevertheless transparent, attempt to circumvent the principles of
Botta," id. at 140, 379 A.2d at 279, supports the view that this was an indirect suggestion of a
per diem formula. Id. The supreme court, however, found that the summation clearly violated
the guidelines stated in Botta. 78 N.J. at 353, 396 A.2d at 343. These comments can be harmonized by recalling that the Botta Rule prohibits both direct and indirect suggestions of per diem
sums for pain. 26 N.J. at 99, 103, 138 A.2d at 722, 725. Under a strict interpretation of a
formula-applying a dollar figure to a unit of time-the movie ticket comment falls short of
directly suggesting a formula. A per diem sum can be inferred, however, from the juxtaposition
of the comment concerning $3 for two hours of enjoyment, and the question how much is an
hour of pain worth. Thus, an indirect suggestion is characterized by a need to use inference to
identify a formula. When compared with the Botta formula of fifty cents an hour, the Gilborges
movie ticket comment is clearly a violation of Botta by indirect suggestion. For an even more
expansive reading of the indirect suggestion, see Cox v. Valley Fair Corp., 83 N.J. at 385-86,
416 A.2d at 812. See also text accompanying notes 213-19 & 235-37 infra.
11 153 N.J. Super. at 139-42, 379 A.2d at 278-80.
l8 Id. at 140-42, 379 A.2d at 278-80. On its own motion, the appellate division supplemented
the record with the Gilborges attorney's lecture on his "one million dollar summation." Id. at
139-40, 379 A.2d at 278. The court examined the lecture to demonstrate the impropriety of the
argument. Id. In his lecture, the Gilborges' attorney stressed the use of words such as
"'astronomical,' "'big case,"' and "'millions of ways."' Id. at 142, 379 A.2d at 279-80. He
advised that use of these words helps jurors relate to the plaintiff in a way that can be translated
into dollars and cents. Id., 379 A.2d at 279. Apparently, the attorney was more concerned with
presenting and keeping the idea of "millions" before the jury than with presenting a formula.
Id., 379 A.2d at 280.
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On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey agreed that counsel's summation violated the guidelines set forth in Botta.' 4 The
attorney's suggestion of a per diem formula prejudiced the defendant's right to have the damages fairly ascertained.'" Accordingly, the
court expressly reaffirmed the Botta Rule that an attorney may not
suggest per diem sums to the jury for pain and suffering.' s6 Again,
such suggestions were viewed as injecting speculation into the trial
on a matter incapable of being evaluated.' 7 Thus, Gilborges reinforced the letter and spirit of the Botta Rule.
Cox v. Valley Fair Corp. - Botta Extended
The most recent development in the Botta prohibition against
per diem arguments was announced in Cox v. Valley Fair Corp.",
In that case, plaintiff sought recovery of damages for personal injuries
arising from a slip-and-fall accident in defendant's supermarket.8 8
Medvin, plaintiff's counsel, focused upon the issue of damages during
his closing statements."9 He gave " 'an example of how we .. .put a
monetary value on pain' " when he argued: '"' " 'Your dentist examines your mouth and he sees a bad tooth. . . . [I]t is very possible
for him to take that tooth out without giving you any painkiller, . . .
[b]ut how many of us wouldn't pay the extra few dollars to have a
painkiller to avoid that pain?' "192 Medvin then asked the jury to
"'think what it means to suffer on a daily basis"' for a lifetime when
evaluating the plaintiff's intangible damages. ' He also informed the
jury that plaintiff's life expectancy was 31 years, or 11,000 days when

114 78 N.J. at 353, 396 A.2d at 343. In reviewing the Botta violation, the supreme court did
not consider the attorney's lecture. Id. It did indicate, however, that reference to the parents'
emotional loss was improper, since the parents had not sued for damages in their own right. Id.
1a5
Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
Is'
83 N.J. 381, 416 A.2d 809 (1980).
189
Id. at 383, 416 A.2d at 810. Ruby Cox suffered arm, leg, and back injuries as a result of
the fall. She then underwent physical therapy treatments for approximately eleven months. Id.
At the time of the trial, Mrs. Cox still complained of stiffness, soreness, and occasional numbness in her leg. Testimony indicated her disabilities were permanent and directly related to the
fall. Mrs. Cox's special damages included $500 in lost wages and $627.25 in medical expenses.
Id. Mr. Cox joined his wife in the suit seeking per quod damages. Id. The jury awarded him
$1,000, but the appellate division vacated this judgment. Id. at 387, 416 A.2d at 812. On
appeal, the supreme court reinstated the judgment of $1,000 for Mr. Cox finding that the errors
in summation did not affect this award. Id.
110Id. at 384-85, 416 A.2d at 811-12.
"I,Id. at 385, 416 A.2d at 811 (quoting summation).
12 Id. at 384-85, 416 A.2d at 811 (quoting summation).
1- Id. at 385, 416 A.2d at 811 (quoting summation).
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multiplied out, and argued that she was "'entitled to fair compensation, not nominal, but fair compensation for each and every one of
those days.""'
The jury returned a verdict of $51,200.' The trial
judge refused to overturn the verdict as excessive because the award
was not so disproportionate as to be manifestly unjust." He did not
comment on the Botta question.'97 The appellate division, when confronted with the issue, held that counsel's summation violated Botta
and remanded for a new trial on the issue of damages only. 98 Certification was granted to determine whether the appellate division had
unnecessarily extended Botta."'
In an opinion authored by Justice Sullivan, the Supreme Court
of New Jersey held that counsel's summation contained a "subtle
appeal" to the golden rule and clearly suggested a per diem formula,
thus violating the prohibitions of Botta.2° The golden rule was invoked by counsel's suggestions "that the members of the jury consider the few extra dollars they would be willing to spend to avoid
the pain of a tooth extraction and to think what it means to suffer on
a daily basis." 201 The court found a per diem formula suggested in
counsel's reference to plaintiff's daily pain, people's willingness to pay
a few extra dollars for a painkiller, and plaintiff's life expectancy in
days with a request for fair compensation for each day.2 2 The court
found this to be a "patent violation" of the Botta Rule, reasoning that
the summation must be considered as a whole, regardless of whether
any particular statement, standing alone, violated Botta.20 ' Justice
Sullivan also examined the effect of counsel's summation on the jury's
verdict. He held that though the trial court did not find the verdict
manifestly unjust 20M the size of the verdict indicated that the per diem
argument of counsel "impermissibly influenced the jury." 205
194 Id. at 385, 416 A.2d at 811 (quoting summation). The defendant's attorney objected to
Medvin's comments that a monetary value could be placed on pain and suffering. Id., 416 A.2d
at 811-12.
" Id. at 383, 416 A.2d at 810.
19

Il

Id.

Id. at 383-84, 416 A.2d at 810. The trial judge's failure to comment may indicate that he
did not find a Botta violation in the summation.
1 Id. at 384, 416 A.2d at 810.
191Id. at 383, 416 A.2d at 810.
20 Id. at 385, 416 A.2d at 812. The supreme court affirmed the remand for a new trial on
Mrs. Cox's damages. Id. at 387, 416 A.2d at 812.
20 Id. at 385, 416 A.2d at 812.
-' Id. at 385-86, 416 A.2d at 812.
- Id. at 386, 416 A.2d at 812.
2N

Id.

Id. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Handler disagreed with the majority and asserted that
counsel's summation was within the bounds of reasonable advocacy. Id. at 387, 416 A.2d at 813
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The Implications of Cox
The Supreme Court of New Jersey in Cox found an implicit appeal to the golden rule in a neutral statement and applied the Botta
Rule to a summation that did not suggest a per diem formula. In
addition, the courts analysis of the size of the verdict departed from
previous treatment of what constituted an improper argument."'
The apparent expansion of what constitutes an appeal to the
golden rule is suggested by the court's characterization of the appeal
as a subtle one.2"' In Botta, the attorney told the jurors to put themselves in the plaintiff's position, to think about how much they would
want to endure this painful experience, and then suggested fifty cents
an hour. °a The first requirement of asking the jurors to step into the
shoes of the injured party might be satisfied in Cox by Medvin's suggestion that the jury " 'think what it means to suffer on a daily
basis.' ""
But the second requirement that the jurors be asked to
consider how much they would want to be paid to suffer this pain, or
how much the injured party would probably want, does not appear to
(Handler, J., dissenting). He criticized the majority for interpreting Botta's fair and reasonable
compensation standard "too sweepingly and [too) severely," by misapplying it to the facts. Id. at
388, 416 A.2d at 813 (Handler, J., dissenting). Focusing on the absence of a specific monetary
figure, Justice Handler found no suggestion of a per diem argument or a "subtle appeal" to the
golden rule. Id. He noted that the tooth extraction example lacked a specific monetary suggestion and merely demonstrated that pain is compensable. He further commented that there was
no impropriety in stating Cox's life expectancy in days. Id.
During the course of his summation, Mr. Medvin commented on the relationship between
out-of-pocket expenses and the intangible damages of pain and suffering. He stated:
[W]e are talking about . . . out-of-pocket expenses of $1,200.
Members of the jury, that represents a tiny fraction of the total damages in this
case because merely to contemplate something for their out-of-pocket expenses
doesn't begin, doesn't even start to take into consideration the second element,
damages, what I call the intangible element of damages, pain and suffering, permanent disability. So the $1,200 of out-of-pocket expenses is nothing in relation to
these intangibles.
Petition for Certification and Appendix for Petitioners at PA-12, Cox v. Valley Fair Corp., 83
N.J. 381, 416 A.2d 809. Justice Handler found Medvin's comment that out-of-pocket expenses
would not constitute reasonable compensation in light of plaintiff's pain and suffering was
"reasonable and accurate." 83 N.J. at 388, 416 A.2d at 813 (Handler, J., dissenting). Further,
since no court found the verdict excessive, he viewed counsel's remarks as not "so suggestive"
as to require the verdict be overturned. Id. at 388-89, 416 A.2d at 813 (Handler, J., dissenting).
Hence, Justice Handler found no violation of the Botta Rule. Id.
See notes 238-47 infra and accompanying text.
Id. at 385, 416 A.2d at 812. The Cox court restated the Botta prohibition against the
golden rule: an attorney may not suggest "to the jury that it apply the 'golden rule' under which
jurors would fix what they would want as compensation if they had sustained the injuries, or
what the pain and suffering would be worth to them." Id. at 384, 416 A.2d at 811.
208 26 N.J. at 92, 138 A.2d at 718. See note 75, and text accompanying notes 75 & 78-80
supra.
0 83 N.J. at 385, 416 A.2d at 811 (quoting summation). See notes 32-35 supra and accompanying text.
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have been met."' To ask, " 'how many of us wouldn't pay the extra
few dollars to have a painkiller to avoid th[e] pain,' "2" is not equivalent to a request that the jurors give the plaintiff the amount of compensation they would want for this pain and suffering."2
The Botta prohibition against per diem arguments was also
pushed to the outer limits in Cox.213 Prior to Cox, an attorney could
not directly or indirectly suggest a dollars per unit of time formula for
pain and suffering. A comparison of the "per diem formulas" identified under the Botta Rule, however, reveals that the New Jersey
courts have not required a strict formula. For example, in Botta the
attorney suggested fifty cents an hour.2"' In Gilborges, the attorney, after noting that three, four or five dollars would purchase two
hours of entertainment, asked how much an hour of pain was
worth.2 5 In Cox, however, it is difficult to isolate the particular language that suggests a formula. Plaintiff's counsel asserted that people
can and do place a monetary value on pain in their everyday lives
and then demonstrated this evaluation through his tooth extraction
example."6 In so doing, he contradicted Botta's underlying rationale,
that is, pain and suffering have no known dimensions and cannot be
equated with dollars and cents.21 7 The court reacted by finding an
attenuated formula in Medvin's comments with respect to an " 'extra
few dollars' " for a painkiller, repeated references to daily pain and
210 See 83 N.J. at 384, 416 A.2d at 811; 26 N.J. at 94, 138 A.2d at 719.

83 N.J. at 385, 416 A.2d at 811 (quoting summation).
Handler, in his dissenting opinion, stated that the tooth extraction example was not
monetarily specific enough to constitute an appeal to the golden rule. Id. at 385, 416 A.2d at
813 (Handler, J., dissenting). Rather than urging the jurors to put themselves in the plaintiff's
shoes, this example was used rhetorically to show that pain is a factor to be considered in
determining damages. Id. Despite Justice Handler's perceptive analysis, it is questionable
whether the suggestion of a particular dollar figure is necessary for a golden rule argument. See
notes 32-35 supra and accompanying text.
213 One commentator has succinctly described the effect of the Cox decision on the Botta
Rule:
With the advent of Cox, the law went from a prohibition against equating a unit of
time with a unit of money, which is a relatively precise and definable mathematical
formulation, to barring all "subtle" allusions to an assessment of damages, which
include as a part of the equation the element of time and duration of pain and
suffering.
Stein, Expansion of the Botta Rule, 106 N.J.L.J. 189, 189 (1980).
214 See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
215 See text accompanying note 174 supra. When the Gilborges summation is analyzed in
221

2J2 justice

light of the Cox holding, Gilborges appears to lose its status as the outermost limit of what
constitutes an indirect suggestion. See note 181 supra. An indirect suggestion of a per diem
formula in New Jersey may now be presented even if there is no mention of a dollar amount.
See 83 N.J. at 385-86, 416 A.2d at 812.
216 See text accompanying notes 191-92 supra.
217 26 N.J. at 92-93, 95-96, 138 A.2d at 718-20.
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suffering, and the statement of plaintiff's life expectancy in days coupled with the request for fair compensation for each day.2"' Perhaps
the court found a dollar amount per unit of time suggestion in the
above statements, but it may not be necessary to identify these elements with specificity under Cox. Arguably some comments taken
separately did not violate the Botta Rule, but the court concluded
that the summation must be looked at as a whole.219
Particular attention should be given to the comment on plaintiff's
life expectancy in days,12° since this statement relates to Botta's prohibition against considering per hour or per diem sums."' In Cross,
the appellate division held that stating plaintiff's life expectancy in
days did not suggest a per diem formula,222 nonetheless, the blackboard illustration was highly suggestive. Segmenting life expectancy
into days focused the jury's attention on evaluating pain in terms of a
daily amount of compensation. Further, the chart viewed as a whole
reflected the notion of a formula; the entries for past and future lost
earnings were computed on a per diem basis and the jury could have
readily applied the logic of determining lost earnings to the question
of damages for pain and suffering.223 Hence, the essence of a per
diem formula was implicitly suggested but no violation of the Botta
Rule was found.224 In contrast, a reference to life expectancy in days
in Cox was deemed to be part of a per diem formula.- The court
apparently found the reference tainted by its relationship to the other
statements in the summation, the overall effect generating the suggestion of a formula.
218 83 N.J. at 385-86, 416 A.2d at 812 (quoting summation). Justice Handler, in his dissenting

opinion, interpreted this example more realistically noting that it merely demonstrated that pain
is compensable. He also noted that a Botta violation required a specific mention of a monetary
amount. 83 N.J. at 388, 416 A.2d at 813 (Handler, J., dissenting). See note 205 supra.
215 83 N.J. at 386, 416 A.2d at 812.
Id. at 385, 416 A.2d at 811.
'2 See 26 N.J. at 99, 103, 138 A.2d at 722, 724.
22 60 N.J. Super. at 76-77, 158 A.2d at 372.
'2 See note 163 supra. Consider the discussion of the Cox approach to finding a Botta
violation-looking at the summation as a whole. See text accompanying note 219 supra, and
notes 226 & 227 infra and accompanying text.
22 See 60 N.J. Super. at 77, 158 A.2d at 372. See generally Carton, supra note 5, at 452
n.44. Reconsidering Cross in light of the per diem approach in other jurisdictions, the blackboard illustration approved therein could be characterized as an illustrative argument which
suggests the mechanics of a formula without presenting specific dollar values for pain. See note
62 supra and accompanying text.
m 83 N.J. at 385-86, 416 A.2d at 812. Justice Handler, in his dissenting opinion, found no
impropriety in Medvin's statement of plaintiff's life expectancy in days. He reasoned that "[t]he
remaining life expectancy of a personal injury plaintiff-whether measured in years, months or
days-is a fact quite properly before the jury and, thus, permissible for inclusion in summation." Id. at 388, 416 A.2d at 813 (Handler, J., dissenting).
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It is unclear whether Cross remains good law in light of the Cox
holding.2s Perhaps stating plaintiff's life expectancy in days, absent
other improper comments,22 7 is not a violation of the Botta Rule.
However, the subjective analysis applied by the Cox court does not
provide any useful guidelines. It may be very difficult to determine
when the juxtaposition of particular phrases suggests a formula.
Although there is clearly no magic incantation that identifies a per
diem formula, the Botta analysis as applied in Cox leaves the area in
hopeless confusion.
Careful examination of the Cox decision in light of New Jersey
precedent provides some insight into the changed scope of what constitutes a per diem argument, but the extent of this expansion and its
appropriateness in the 1980's can be more fully appreciated when
viewed against the background of the development of the per diem
technique in other jurisdictions.)2 The closing argument in Cox has
properties similar to those constituting an illustrative per diem
argument. 229 It may be recalled that the attorney presents a per
diem formula merely as a method for calculating damages for pain
and suffering under the illustrative approach. Implicit in the reasoning of the jurisdictions that allow this form of argument is the notion
that jurors can establish a value for pain. The argument then suggests
a method for computing the damages. 2 ° In the Cox summation,
Medvin proposed that people can and do place a monetary value on
pain in their everyday lives."' He carefully refrained from suggesting any actual figures.2 2 Compare this component of the Cox argument with the closing statement in Sinclair which "came seriously
close" but fell short of infringing upon Wyoming's per diem
prohibition. 3 The attorney, in Sinclair, presented an analogous
physician-operation example in order to illustrate how the avoidance

' The Cox court did not address the question of the continued validity of the Cross holding.
Given the court's reasoning that a permissible comment may be part of a Botta violation based
upon the context in which it was presented, a court would clearly have the tools to invalidate a
reference to life expectancy in days without explicitly prohibiting it. See id. at 386, 416 A.2d at
812.
' Since improper comments may be defined by their context, a court has almost unlimited
ability to expand the scope of the Cox formulation of the Botta Rule. In effect, a court could
construct violations of the rule solely from implications drawn from the context of the statements. See id.
"
See notes 54-67 & 136-59 supra and accompanying text.
2' See 83 N.J. at 384-85, 416 A.2d at 811.
See text accompanying note 56 supra.
" 83 N.J. at 384-85, 416 A.2d at 811. See text accompanying notes 191 & 216 supra.
21283 N.J. at 384-85, 416 A.2d at 811.
m 584 P.2d at 1050. See text accompanying note 156 supra.
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of pain may be valued. It should be noted that this example went
beyond Cox in that the attorney placed a dollar figure on that
avoidance. "
The majority's finding of a patent violation in the Cox summation
demonstrates the expanded reach of the Botta prohibition.3" Clearly,
the process of implication necessary in Cox to identify the suggestion
of a per diem formula indicates that the argument would lie on the
outermost periphery of the illustrative approach."3 While Medvin's
comments were somewhat beyond an illustrative argument which
merely proposes the mechanics of a mathematical formula without
suggesting a particular dollar value,237 the suggestion, if any, that the
jury formularize pain was implicit, not patent as suggested by the
court.
Prior to Cox, the amount returned by the jury was not considered relevant to a Botta violation since the prejudice was believed to
be the impermissible influence on the jury, and not merely a large
verdict.2 38 The Botta court had focused primarily on the per diem
prohibition as a method of preventing interference with the jury's
decision-making process.' 5 The court in Cox focused on the size of
the verdict. This portion of the Cox analysis signals the court's most
striking departure from the prior formulation of the Botta Rule. In
determining how close the attorney's comments came to improper
argument, Justice Sullivan examined the relationship between the
amount awarded and the damages proven.24 Mrs. Cox had proven
$500.00 in lost wages and $672.25 in medical expenses, and had additional claims for pain, suffering, and permanent disability. Justice

z See 584 P.2d at 1050; 83 N.J. at 384-85, 416 A.2d at 811.
z 83 N.J. at 385-86, 416 A.2d at 812. Looking to other jurisdictions, both sides of the per
diem controversy seem to be moving toward approval of the illustrative approach. Many courts
approving the per diem approach have limited permissible argument to those of the illustrative
type. See note 127 supra. Further, several courts following the Botta Rule have approved
arguments similar to or going beyond the closing statement in Cox, which have been of the
illustrative type. See notes 141-46, 152 & 156-58 supra and accompanying text.
' Compare Evening Star Newspaper Co. v. Gray, 179 A.2d 377, 381 (D.C. 1962) (where
attorney suggested $3.50 or $7.00 a day) and King v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 107
N.W.2d 509, 517 (N. D. 1961) (where attorney could only suggest that jury determine per diem
value for pain, and multiply it by number of days involved) with Cox v. Valley Fair Corp., 83
N.J. at 384-85, 416 A.2d at 811-12 (counsel commented on plaintiff's daily pain, people's willingness to pay a few extra dollars for painkiller, and stated plaintiffs life expectancy in days with
request for fair compensation for each day).
7 See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
'3 See Purpora v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 53 N.J. Super. 475, 481, 147 A.2d 591, 595
(App. Div. 1959).
26 N.J. at 98-103, 138 A.2d at 722-25.
o 83 N.J. at 386, 416 A.2d at 812.
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Sullivan apportioned the verdict as the jury apparently had: $1,200 in
special damages and $50,000 for the subjective complaints. 1 He
stated that the trial judge had not taken his analysis far enough in
reviewing the verdict and concluded that the size of the verdict may
be considered in determining whether the jury was impermissibly
influenced.2 42 The size of the verdict was held to support the conten24 3
tion that the plaintiff's summation improperly influenced the jury.
The court's analysis distinguished between excessiveness of the
verdict 244 and a violation of the Botta Rule as demonstrated by the
size of the verdict.1 5 Under Cox, a large verdict alone may indicate
impermissible influence on the jury, but the verdict need not be excessive to be considered by the court.2 The test for an improper argument can now be visualized as a sliding scale.4 Where there is a clear
statement of a formula, it will be deemed a violation of Botta regardless
of the size of the verdict. Where the suggested formula is more indirect
and requires examination of the summation as a whole, the size of the
verdict may be considered as an indicator of impermissible influence.
In other words, the closer the comments come to the Botta line

241

id.

2uId.
u3

Id.

2" Id. The standards for determining excessive jury verdicts in New Jersey are set forth in

notes 278 & 279 infra and accompanying text.
245 83 N.J. at 386, 416 A.2d at 812. The size of the verdict analysis in Cox might also be
construed as recognizing excessiveness of the verdict as a criterion under Botta. Some courts in
other states have held that an excessive verdict is necessary for a violation of the per diem
prohibition. E.g., McCormick v. Smith, 459 S.W.2d 272, 278 (Mo. 1970). Other courts have
recognized that prejudice resulting from per diem arguments would be manifested in excessive
verdicts. E.g., Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d at 180, 417 P.2d at 680, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
246 83 N.J. at 386, 416 A.2d at 812.
17 A comparison of Botta, Gilborges, and Cox will demonstrate the functioning of the sliding
scale:

Botta
Gilborges

Cox

Formula
Suggested

Size of
Verdict

Extent of
Injuries

504 an hour
$3, $4, $5
for two hours of
entertainment,
how much is one
hour of pain worth?
Tooth extraction
example, life

$5,500
$1 million

Severity disputed
Total
paralysis

$51,200

Stiffness,
soreness,

expectancy in

occasional

days, reference
to plaintiff's
daily pain

numbness

COMMENTS

1981]

without actually crossing over, the more important the size of the
verdict becomes in finding a violation. Thus, where a verdict is large
but not excessive, the court now has an additional avenue of review
under the Botta Rule.
A REEVALUATION OF THE BOTTA RULE
The New Jersey supreme court surprisingly'4 declined the
opportunity to reconsider the Botta Rule in the context of the Cox
decision, but indicated that Botta might be reconsidered under the
proper circumstances. 49 In formulating the rule, the court narrowly
circumscribed the scope of permissible argument and effectively foreclosed the presentation of the monetary aspects of pain and suffering
by concluding that to admonish the jury to disregard suggested dollar
Further, the expansion in Cox unfigures is a useless exercise.'
necessarily brought within the scope of the rule argument beyond the
reasonable limits of its application."' The implications of this decision underscore the need to reexamine the propriety of per diem
arguments.
Policy Considerations
The Botta court identified three major policy considerations in
analyzing the per diem issue: the scope of permissible summation,"
the jury's function,- and the fair administration of the trial. 2 The
scope of summation issue is best described as the legal question of
whether counsel's per diem argument is based on independent eviTraditionally, an attorney has been
dence or legitimate inference.'
2" Although neither party raised the Botta issue at trial or before the appellate division, 83
N.J. at 386, 416 A.2d at 812, the Association of Trial Lawyers of America submitted an amicus
brief on the issue. Id. The Association took the position that the Botta Rule should be overruled
and per diem summations permitted in New Jersey or, in the alternative, the Botta Rule should
not be expanded to proscribe equating pain and suffering over time with money. The Association of Trial Lawyers of America, Amicus Brief, On Behalf of Movant at 2, 9, Cox v. Valley Fair
Corp., 83 N.J. 381, 416 A.2d 809 (1980).
a
29 83 N.J. at 386-87, 416 A.2d at 812. One commentator noted that theoretically "no case is
proper one to review the [Botta] rule since no attorney who follows the law and the ethical
constraints of his profession can rightfully jeopardize his client's case by testing the concept in
his summation." Stein, Expansion of the Botta Rule, 106 N.J.L.J. 189, 194-95 (1980).
He further asserted that no better vehicle existed to test the Botta Rule than the Cox case,
in which the Association of Trial Lawyers of America had already filed an amicus brief, and
participation of the Bar could have been easily achieved. Id. at 195.
- See 26 N.J. at 99, 103-04, 138 A.2d at 722, 725.
251 See text accompanying notes 207-19 & 235-37 supra.
252 See text accompanying notes 98-100 supra.
__ See text accompanying notes 93-97 supra.
21 See text accompanying notes 101-05 supra.
25 See Recent Decisions, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 269, 274.
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permitted to argue based upon the evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom.5 6 Proponents of per diem arguments have
asserted that an attorney should have wide latitude in arguing damages to the jury,"7 while opponents, contending that such arguments
lack an evidentiary basis, have urged that the courts confine arguments closely to the evidence presented."5 Since the scope of permissible summation is basically a question of definition, it is a factor
to be weighed but is not determinative of whether per diem arguments should be permitted.
Questions concerning per diem arguments and the interaction of
the jury's function 15' have often been analyzed in terms of invasion of
the province of the jury.2" Clearly, an unbiased determination of
damages is essential to the fair resolution of a personal injury suit.
Yet, the traditional method of instructing jurors to award reasonable
compensation has often been criticized as inadequate to the task.26
"6 Wimberly v. Paterson, 75 N.J. Super. 584, 604, 183 A.2d 691, 702 (App. Div. 1962).
Generally, counsel is allowed wide latitude in summation and may argue from the evidence to
any conclusion the jury may freely reach, regardless of whether it is "improbable, illogical,
erroneous, or even absurd." Id. Counsel's conclusions, however, may not be presented in language that transcends the bounds of legitimate argument. Moreover, they must be grounded in
evidence. Id.
"' See Cooper, supra note 4, at 406-07.
2" See Cooper, supra note 4, at 405-06. Opponents also assert that jurors might tend to
sympathize with the plaintiff on the pain and suffering issue. Therefore, the attorney's argument
must be controlled to avoid prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 405.
2- One commentator, writing about juries and personal injury litigation in the 1950's, indicated that the jury tended to approach the assessment of damages by searching for a single
appropriate sum rather than by analyzing the components of damages. See Kalven, The Jury, the
Law and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIo ST. L.J. 158, 161-62 (1958). Hence, the
jury might be less responsive to pain and suffering as an element of damages. He asserted that
when the jury's attention was directed to the process of adding together the components of
damages the award would be increased. Id. at 161-62. The jury would explicitly consider pain
and suffering in addition to the tangible elements of medical expenses and lost earnings and
therefore return a larger verdict. Id. at 161-62, 170. Given the above argument, the per diem
approach is a valid attempt to focus the jury's attention on an element of damages that should
be assessed.
0 E.g., Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d at 177, 417 P.2d at 678-79, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 134-35. See
generally Carton, supra note 5, at 449-55; Cooper, supra note 4, at 408-10.
"' Cooper, supra note 4, at 395. See Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d at 181, 417 P.2d at 681, 53
Cal. Rptr. at 137; Newbury v. Vogel, 151 Colo. 520, 526, 379 P.2d 811, 814 (1963); Barretto v.
Akau, 51 Hawaii at 394, 463 P.2d at 923; Yates v. Wenk, 363 Mich. 311, 317-18, 109 N.W.2d
828, 830-31 (1961).
Society recognizes "the day" as the basic unit of human affairs, yet the traditional method
of determining damages requires jurors to consider pain and suffering in a "lifetime lump,"
while they live their lives on a day by day basis. Jurors are unfamiliar with lifetime meals,
lifetime haircuts or lifetime pain. Therefore, '[florcing jurors to think in a language they have
never heard of cannot be designed or expected to produce just results." Caylor v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 190 Kan. 261, 277, 374 P.2d 53, 64 (1962) (Wertz, J., dissenting). The
per diem approach can permit "more explicit comprehension and humanization of the plaintiff's
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Jurors are presumed to know the nature of pain and the value of
money.262 Their function is viewed as one of equating the two in
order to determine a money award."z The trial judge's instruction to
use their impartial judgment in making this determination provides
minimal guidance for the jurors. 64 The use of an illustrative per
diem argument which suggests a course of reasoning for the jurors to
follow in translating the evidence of pain and suffering into an
to provide the guidelines lacking
award, 2" however, could be used
2
under the traditional method. 6
The fair administration of trial issue has been framed in terms of
insuring adversary parties an equal opportunity to offer proof and
submit arguments. 2 7 Two competing interests may be identified
with this issue. Counsel for plaintiff has a right to the "full fruits of
effective advocacy" on the issue of damages. 2' Such is essential to a
personal injury suit. However, counsel for defendant also has a right
to "a fair assessment of damages once liability" is established. 269 These
interests can be reconciled without resort to the "all or nothing"
approach under the current Botta Rule, but this requires examination
of the source of the fair administration question-fear of prejudice
from per diem arguments.

predicament" since the "'worth'' of pain may be easier to comprehend when considered over
shorter periods of time such as a day or an hour. Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d at 181, 417 P.2d
at 681, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
26 N.J. at 103, 138 A.2d at 725. Per diem arguments have been criticized for replacing
the jury's "common knowledge and experience" about pain. One court, however, perceptively
noted that a person who has "intimately experienced" similar pain and suffering would not be
allowed to sit on the jury. Grossnickle v. Village of Germantown, 3 Ohio St. 2d 96, 100, 209
N.E.2d 442, 446 (1965). Hence, the average juror has not been exposed to the type of pain he
is asked to evaluate in monetary terms. Id. This consideration underscores the jurors' need for
more guidance than their enlightened consciences.
26 N.J. at 103, 138 A.2d at 725.
24 Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d at 181, 417 P.2d at 681, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 137. Accord,
Newbury v. Vogel, 151 Colo. 520, 526, 379 P.2d 811, 814 (1963). The inadequacy of the traditional approach raises an important policy question: is it fair that an injured plaintiff's financial
future be determined by a jury with no other criterion than reasonable judgment? See Cooper,
supra note 4, at 395.
Corkery v. Greenberg, 253 Iowa 846, 855, 114 N.W.2d 327, 332 (1962). See note 60 supra
and accompanying text.
Worsley v. Corcelli, 377 A.2d 215, 219 (R.I. 1977). Accord, Newbury v. Vogel, 151 Colo.
520, 526, 379 P.2d 811, 814 (1963); Evening Star Newspaper Co. v. Gray, 179 A.2d 377, 382
(D.C. 1962); Corkery v. Greenberg, 253 Iowa 846, 855, 114 N.W.2d 327, 332 (1962); Yates v.
Wenk, 363 Mich. 311, 318-19, 109 N.W.2d 828, 831 (1961).
11726 N.J. at 101, 138 A.2d at 723-24.
Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d at 181, 417 P.2d at 681, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 137. See N.J. CT. R.
DR 7-101, which imposes a duty on attorneys to represent their clients zealously with respect
to all matters, id., including damages.
Gilborges v. Wallace, 78 N.J. at 353, 396 A.2d at 343.
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Prejudice occurs at several levels. First, a per diem argument
can generate prejudice where it is imbedded in an appeal to the
golden rule or other inflammatory remarks."' Second, if the jury
adopts counsel's proffered figures without critical evaluation and
thereby abdicates its damage-assessing role, the defendant is
prejudiced."' Finally, prejudice may be the product of the jury's use
of a formula to determine damages, thus creating the excessive verdict problem.272
Various safeguards have been recognized as adequate to prevent
the feared prejudicial effects. The trial judge, for example, can reduce prejudicial impact through a number of cautionary instructions
particularly by admonishing the jurors that suggestions made by
counsel in summation are not binding upon them.2 7 3 Other safeguards stem from the jurors' awareness of the attorney's role as a
partisan advocate, and their ability to distinguish between per diem
arguments and evidence of the value of pain. 27 ' The adversary svstem itself provides an effective counterbalance such that the per diem
technique can be used as a double-edged sword with which defendant's attorney may argue the suggested figures are excessive or present his own suggestions.2 7" The attorney who uses this technique is
aware that he bears the risk of overpersuasion if the mathematical
computations are carried to an extreme because the jury would probably dismiss the argument and opposing counsel would have sufficient
2 76
ammunition for rebuttal.
270

For examples of summations involving appeals to the golden rule or other inflammatory,

remarks, see notes 63-66 & 75 supra and accompanying text.
" See Caley v. Manicke, 24 I11.2d 390, 393, 182 N.E.2d 206, 208-09 (1962). See Cooper,
supra note 4, at 409-10.
275 See Caley v. Manicke 24 Ill. 2d 390, 393, 182 N.E.2d 327, 332 (1967); Louisville & Nashville R.R., 339 S.W.2d 155, 161 (Ky. 1960); Cooper, supra note 4, at 408-09; Recent Decisions,
1962 U. ILL. L.F. 269, 274; Note, 33 S. CAL. L. REv. 214, 219 (1960).
21 E.g., Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d at 180-81, 417 P.2d at 680-81, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 136-37;
Yates v. Wenk, 363 Mich. 311, 318, 109 N.W.2d 828, 831 (1961); Worsley v. Corcelli, 377 A.2d
215, 219 (R.I. 1977). Other cautionary instructions which may be used to control prejudice
include an instruction that the argument is not evidence; that any statement by counsel that is
not sustained by the evidence should be disregarded; that the jury is not bound by any proposed method of calculating damages; and, the jury's duty is to award only reasonable compensation. Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d at 181, 417 P.2d at 681, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 137; Jones v.
Hogan, 56 Wash. 2d 23, 31-32, 351 P.2d 153, 159 (1960).
274 E.g., Worsley v. Corcelli, 377 A.2d 215, 219 (R.I. 1977); Jones v. Hogan, 56 Wash. 2d
23,
31-32, 351 P.2d 153, 159 (1966).
Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d at 181, 417 P.2d at 681, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 137. Accord, Yates
v. Wenk, 363 Mich. 311, 318, 109 N.W.2d 828, 831 (1961). Further, defendant's counsel can
underscore other defects in the plaintiff's formula. He "may point out ... overlapping items
such as inability to lead a normal life, humiliation and embarrassment," or demonstrate that
plaintiff's pain may be minimized by sedation. See Phillips, supra note 6, at 85.
21 E.g., Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d at 180, 417 P.2d at 681, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 137; Worsley
v. Corcelli, 377 A.2d 215, 219 (R.I. 1977).
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A remedy still exists if the jury is misled into awarding an excessive verdict after the aforementioned safeguards have been employed.
The trial judge has the power to set aside or reduce any verdict 277
which is "so disproportionate to the injury and resulting disability
shown as to shock his conscience and to convince him that to sustain
the award would be manifestly unjust." 27 In addition, the appellate
court has the power to review such an unreasonable result under
similar standards. 279
In sum, the potential prejudice problem in the issue of fair
administration may be mitigated by the appellate court's power to
review and the trial court's power to reduce any unreasonable verdict; by the adversarial process of argument; by the trial court's
cautionary instructions; and by the jury's responsible exercise of its
role as ultimate judge of reasonable compensation which is the basis
of every damage award for personal injuries.
THE BOTTA RULE-A PROPOSED SOLUTION
Per diem arguments should be permitted subject to the following
qualifications. First, the argument should not appeal to the golden
rule or be otherwise inflammatory. Second, the argument should not
urge the attorney's proffered figures on the jury. Finally, per diem
arguments should be limited to the illustrative type which merely
suggests a course of reasoning and does not influence the jury's determination of damages. In determining whether the line has been

277 Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d at 180, 417 P.2d at 680, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 136. Accord,

Newbury v. Vogel, 151 Colo. 520, 527, 379 P.2d 811, 814 (1965).
275 Baxter v. Fairmont Food Co., 74 N.J. 588, 596, 379 A.2d 225, 229 (1977), Sweeney v.
Pruyne, 67 N.J. 314, 315, 338 A.2d 193, 193-94 (1975). This is the test applied by New Jersey
trial courts when reviewing a verdict for excessiveness or when the remedy of remittitur is
sought. The practice has been recognized as a valuable tool for trial administration and has been
"encouraged at both trial and appellate levels to avoid the unnecessary expense and delay of a
new trial." Baxter v. Fairmont Food Co., 74 N.J. at 595, 379 A.2d at 228-29. -[A] court may
not set aside a verdict merely because in its opinion, the jury upon the evidence might well
have found otherwise.'" Hager v. Weber, 7 N.J. 201, 210, 81 A.2d 155, 159 (1951). It is the jury
which has "exclusive privilege and function ... to draw the inferences in the first instance....
Once the jury has reached its decision, the trial judge . . . cannot then step in [and] weigh the
evidence to determine what conclusion he would have come to." Kulbacki v. Sobchinsky, 38
N.J. 435, 444-45, 185 A.2d 835, 841 (1962). Further, the supreme court has stated that "judges
are admonished to resist the natural temptation to substitute their judgment for that of the
jury." Baxter v. Fairmont Food Co., 74 N.J. at 597, 379 A.2d at 229; Dolson v. Anastasia, 55
N.J. 2, 6, 258 A.2d 706, 708 (1969). As stated in Dolson v. Anastasia, the trial judge "is not a
thirteenth and decisive juror." Id. It should be recalled that trial practice concerning remittitur
and setting aside verdicts for excessiveness varies from state to state.
Baxter v. Fairmont Food Co., 74 N.J. 588, 596, 379 A.2d 225, 229 (1977). Again, this is
New Jersey's policy as to appellate review of jury verdicts.
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crossed between permissible per diem and inflammatory argument,
the courts should use the size of the verdict analysis established in
Cox."'° The size of the award would then serve as an indicator of
whether inflammatory remarks impermissibly influenced the jury.
Under present trial practice, defense counsel sums up first, followed by plaintiff's counsel's closing statements. Were per diem
arguments permitted, defense counsel would be placed in the position of having to anticipate plaintiff's use of a per diem formula. To
insure fairness to both parties, defense counsel must have an opportunity to answer plaintiff's per diem argument. This can be achieved
by two procedural approaches. Where plaintiff's counsel presents a
per diem formula for the first time in his closing argument, defense
counsel can be given an opportunity for rebuttal. In the alternative,
the order of summations can be reversed; "' with plaintiff's counsel
arguing first, defense counsel can respond to any formula presented
in his summation.
CONCLUSION
This suggested per diem approach is not a substitute for reasonable compensation. Rather it is one method of attaining that goal.
The illustrative approach when used with the safeguards presented
earlier would balance any prejudicial effect that might arise from a
per diem argument. As one court perceptively stated, "'if the evil
feared is excessive verdicts, then the cure ought to be directed
against the product, not the practice."'"2
Aimee L. Manocchio
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83 N.J. at 386, 416 A.2d at 812. See text accompanying notes 245-47 supra.
2" Courts approving the use of per diem arguments have recognized that defense counsel
should have an opportunity to rebut plaintiff's argument. Grossnickle v. Village of Germantown,
3 Ohio St. 2d 96, 101-02, 209 N.E.2d 442, 447 (1965); Worsley v. Corcelli, 377 A.2d 215, 219
(R.I. 1977). See Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d at 180-81, 417 P.2d at 681, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
In federal criminal trials, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure number 29.1 provides that:
"[aifter the closing of evidence the prosecution shall open the argument. The defense shall be
permitted to reply. The prosecution shall then be permitted to reply in rebuttal." FED. R.
CRIM. P. 29.1. The purpose underlying this procedure is "that fair and effective administration
of justice is best served if the defendant knows the arguments actually made by the prosecution
[on] behalf of conviction before the defendant is faced with the decision whether to reply or
what to reply." Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, FED. R. CraM. P. 29.1. By analogy, in
civil trials where a per diem argument may be used, the fair administration of trial policy would
be furthered if defense counsel's closing statement followed plaintiff's arguments. Defense counsel will know if plaintiff's attorney has used a per diem formula, and will therefore be able to
present an adequate rebuttal.
"s Beagle v. Vasold, 65 Cal. 2d at 178, 417 P.2d at 679, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 135 (quoting
Johnson v. Colglazier, 348 F.2d 420, 429 (5th Cir. 1965)(Brown, J. dissenting)).

